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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendants-Appellants Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., and Silk Touch Laser, LLP, dba Silk Touch 
Med Spa, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipo 
of Boise (hereinafter "Silk Touch" collectively) appeal from judgments entered in favor of 
Plaintiff-Respondent SSgt Charles Ballard (hereinafter "Charles") following a jury trial in a medical 
malpractice/wrongful death lawsuit. The initial trial ended in a mistrial after Silk Touch violated the 
district court's limine order. An Ada County jury found at a second trial that Silk Touch were 
negligent, reckless and caused the death of Charles' wife, SSgt Krystal Ballard (hereinafter 
"Krystal"). The district court entered judgment in the amount of$3,790,436 on the jury's verdict and 
entered a supplemental judgment in the amount of $143,696 on its award of costs. 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings 
On July 26, 2010, twenty-seven year old Krystal died from an infection caused by bacteria 
that Dr. Kerr injected into her right buttocks during a cosmetic surgical procedure on July 21, 2010. 
Tr. 1 p. 552, In. 10 - p. 553, In. 3; p. 556, In. 2 - p. 562, In. 11; p. 594, In. 17 - p. 595, In. 7; R. 2661-
62; Exh. 9 & 17. The bacteria that caused Krystal's death came from contaminated reusable medical 
equipment which Silk Touch failed to properly clean, disinfect and sterilize. Tr. p. 371, In. 24 - 372, 
In. 3; p. 372, In. 17 - p. 376, In. 19; p. 552, In. 24 - p. 553, In. 3. 
1 Three transcripts are included in the appellate record: the transcript of the 2014 jury trial 
and two subsequent proceedings is referred to herein as "Tr.," while the remaining two transcripts 
are referred to by the respective dates of the proceedings: "Tr.(11-5-2013)" and "Tr. (11-14-2013)." 
At the time of her death, Krystal was an otherwise healthy Staff Sergeant in the United States 
Air Force. Exh. 5, p. 1-3; Tr. p. 403, In. 2-9; p. 412, In. 6-19; R. 2661-62. Charles and Krystal 
resided in Mountain Home where they were stationed. Tr. p. I 065, In. 2 - p. 1066, In. 22. Krystal 
earned numerous medals and accommodations during her military service including Airman of the 
Year in 2009. Exh. 32-34, 37, 39-42; Tr. p. 926, ln. 19- p. 927, ln. 18. According to her Air Force 
supervisor, Krystal exemplified the top military standards and was one of the best airmen he had 
supervised in over two decades of military service. Tr. p. 901, In. 3 - p. 927, In. 18. 
Dr. Kerr, an anesthesiologist who at the time of Krystal's procedure practiced and held 
himself out to be a cosmetic surgeon, performed the surgery. Tr. p. 772, In. 19 - p. 773, In. 15; p. 
824, In. 14-17. Dr. Kerr formed the cosmetic medical business, Silk Touch, with his wife Susan 
Kerr, a former elementary school teacher with no medical background. Id. at p. 773, In. - p. 774, In. 
6; p. 1224, In. 12 - p. 1225, In. 15. As an anesthesiologist, Dr. Kerr completed neither a surgical 
residency nor surgical training and he initially performed limited cosmetic procedures working 
concurrently as an anesthesiologist and at Silk Touch. Id. at p. 773, In. 2-15. Dr. Kerr expanded his 
practice to include surgical liposuction after attending a three day course in 2007. Id. at p. 774, In. 
2-11. In 2008, Dr. Kerr left his anesthetic practice and began practicing cosmetic medicine and 
surgery full time as owner and medical director at Silk Touch. Id. at p. 772, In. 23 - p. 773, In. 15. 
Krystal first visited Silk Touch on July 13, 2010 where she met with employee Donna Berg 
who took Krystal's medical history and discussed the planned procedures. Tr. p. 1318, In. 8 - p. 
1319, In. 22; Exh. 5. According to Dr. Kerr, Ms. Berg had different titles at Silk Touch and he 
2 
referred to her at different times as a "clinical advocate for the patient," "patient educator," '·patient 
consultant" and "patient care coordinator." Id. at p. 1318, In. 20-25; p. 2077, In. 2-7; p. 2209. In. 18 
p. 2210, In. 9. Prior to Silk Touch, Ms. Berg worked in sales, primarily in real estate, and had neither 
medical training nor health care experience. Id. at p. 2210, In. 10 - p. 17. 
Dr. Kerr examined Krystal on July 13,2010 and determined she was an "excellent candidate" 
for the liposuction and fat transfer he performed on July 21,2010. Tr. p. 1340, 1-20; Exh. 5. Surgical 
equipment used in this procedure includes disposable items2 and "reusable medical equipment," 
which must be cleaned, disinfected and sterilized. Tr. p. 343, In. 1-24; p. 12-19; p. 354, In. 6-10. Dr. 
Kerr used different reusable medical equipment during Krystal's surgery, including a handpiece 
affixed with hollow tubes called cannulas. Id. at p. 1968, In. 1 - p. 1969, In. 24. Dr. Kerr harvested 
fat to inject into Krystal's buttocks by suctioning it from her flanks through a cannula and handpiece. 
Id. at p. 791, In. 19 - p. 792, In. 24; p. 1970, In. 4-21; p. 1972, In. 5-24. It was then deposited into a 
reusable canister for storage until injected. Id. at p. 1972, In. 5 - p. 1973, In. 17; 1984, In. 4-12. 
Dr. Kerr acknowledged that: 
• reusable medical equipment is referred to as "critical" because it contacts material 
such as blood or lymphatic tissue and can transfer bacteria; 
• the standard of health care practice applicable to him at the time of Krystal's surgery 
required that he use sterile, reusable medical equipment; 
• failing to adhere to the applicable standard for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing 
reusable medical equipment could cause infection leading to sepsis and death; 
2 On appeal Silk Touch discuss only the pre-packaged sterile equipment they used in 
Krystal's surgery. App. Brief, pp. 3-4. They omit mention of the reusable, surgical equipment despite 
the fact that Silk Touch' s practices for sterilizing such equipment was the focus at trial. Silk Touch 
also fail to discuss their sterilizing practices concerning such equipment - such as they were. 
3 
• his responsibility to mm1m1ze Krystal's risk of infection required him to 
appropriately clean, disinfect and sterilize the reusable medical equipment he used. 
Tr. p. 783, In. 17-24; p. 785, In. 12 - p. 786, In. 19; p. 789, In. 2-14; 2246, In. 25 - p. 2248, In. 4. 
Nevertheless, Silk Touch's cleaning, sterilization and disinfecting practices were wholly 
lacking. Dr. Kerr's daughter Briana, who had just turned twenty, served as the surgical assistant for 
Krystal's surgery and, at the time, father and daughter were the only two sterilizing Silk Touch's 
reusable medical equipment. Tr. p. 843, In. 6-14; p. 144 7, In. 3 - p. 1448, In. 8. Briana began working 
for her father at age nineteen and had neither medical certification nor medical training other than 
on the job training, primarily from her father. Id. at p. 1448, In. 12 - p. 1450, In. 24. Silk Touch had 
no written policies and procedures concerning the cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing of reusable 
medical equipment. Id. at p. 792, In. 25 - p. 793, In. 5. At the time of Krystal's surgery, the sum of 
Briana's knowledge of sterile technique came from Dr. Kerr. Id. at p. 1450, In. 23 - p. 1451, In. 2. 
Dr. Kerr could not recall reading the owner's manual for the machine used during Krystal's 
procedure and did not follow the recommendation that he soak the handpiece and cannulas in an 
enzymatic cleaner to remove material such as fat, blood and other body fluids from the reusable 
equipment. Exh. 48; Tr. p. 796, In. 13-17; p. 800, In. 1-18; p.1646, I. 5 - p. 1647, In. 20; p. 1650, In. 
14-19. Instead of an an enzymatic cleaner, Silk Touch used a mixture ofHibiclens and water which 
is inadequate to sterilize reusable medical equipment. 3 Id. at p. 358, ln. 17-24; p. 362, In. 8-15; p. 
3 Dr. Kerr claimed for the first time at trial that Silk Touch used a detergent with an 
enzymatic cleaner on the reusable medical equipment at issue. This new testimony was not credible 
and contradicted Dr. Kerr's sworn testimony both at deposition as the corporate representative of 
Silk Touch as well as in his verified answer to Charles' interrogatory. Tr. p. 365, In. 9 - p. 366, In. 
4 
7-23 p. 365, In. 9 - p. 366, In. 9. While Silk Touch used an autoclave - a machine using high 
pressure steam in the sterilization process - they neither performed routine maintenance or service 
checks, kept inspection logs nor used biological indicators. Id. at p. 3 70, In. 18 - p. 3 71, In. 23; p. 
827, In. 5-1 O; p. 1423, In. 6; p. 2243, In. 22 - p. 2244, In. 2; p. 2286, In. 12 - p. 2287, In. 22. Dr. Kerr 
could not recall reviewing the autoclave manual. Id. at p. 820, In. 2 - p. 821, In. 10. 
Dr. Dean Sorensen, a physician practicing cosmetic medicine and cosmetic surgery in Ada 
County for decades and in particular in July 2010, testified that Dr. Kerr's practices described above 
fell below the applicable standard of care. See generally Tr. p. 339, In. 13 - p. 376, In. 19. Further, 
the two cosmetic physicians testifying on Silk Touch' s behalf testified that they employ the cleaning, 
disinfecting and sterilizing practices not employed by Silk Touch. Id. at p. 1609, In. 23 - p. 1610, In. 
2;p.1611,ln.15-25;p.1834,ln.20-p.1835,ln.17; 1842,ln.20 1846,ln.4.Drs.GeoffreyStiller 
(Moscow) and John Lundeby (Spokane) testified, however, that they spoke by with a Dr. Kelly 
O'Neil in California whom they had neither met nor heard of and who purportedly described a lesser 
standard of practice for the Boise area.4 Id. at p. 1523, In. 13 - p. 1526, In. 6; p. 1619, In. 2 - p. 1620, 
In. 16; p. 1786, In. 2-24, p. 1790, In. 8-23; compare p. 1835, In. 4-17 and p. 1842, In. 14 - p. 1847, 
In. 13 top. 1789, In. 2-5, p. 1863 In. 18 - p. 1863, In. 22, p. 1638, In, 6 - 21. 
9; p. 358, In. 17-24; p. 362, ln. 8-15. Further, Silk Touch's own standard of care expert testified that 
failing to use an enzymatic cleaner would breach the standard of care. Id at p. 1614, In. 10 - 14. 
4 Dr. O'Neil supposedly practiced in Boise during the time period at issue but never testified 
at trial. The district court precluded SSgt Ballard, in a limine ruling prior to the first trial, from 
offering any evidence of Dr. O'Neil's extensive history of professional misconduct and discipline 
in California and Idaho. See R 1258-65, 1299-1473. 
5 
After her surgery on July 21. 20 l 0, Krystal began experiencing pain in her buttocks and her 
health rapidly declined. Krystal called Silk Touch and the Kerrs on several occasions following her 
surgical procedure. During a call on July 23,2010 to Ms. Kerr, Krystal complained that the pain in 
her buttocks was nine on a scale to ten. Tr. p. 1213, In. 12 - p. 1214, In. 14; p. 1627, In. 3 - 1633, In. 
12. Krystal visited Silk Touch that day and Dr. Kerr released her with an anti-inflammatory steroid 
and prophylactic antibiotic following his examination.5 Exh. 5. Dr. Kerr did not see evidence of 
infection or that Krystal was not taking care of her wounds, including the injection site to her 
buttocks. Tr. p. 2263, In. 5-20. The following evening on July 24, 2010, Krystal called Dr. Kerr to 
complain of continued pain in her buttocks. Id. at p. 1630, In. 11-23. In the early morning hours of 
July 25, 2010, Krystal began experiencing trouble breathing and she and Charles called the 
paramedics who then transported her to Elmore Medical Center. Exh. 9; Tr. p. 1157, ln. 12-p. 1158, 
In. 23. Krystal was airlifted to Saint Alphonsus Hospital in Boise where she died shortly after 
midnight of July 26,2010 - a little over four days after her surgery at Silk Touch. Exh. 7-9. 
An autopsy revealed gram negative bacteria in the subcutaneous tissue in Krystal's right 
buttock at the surgical site where Dr. Kerr had injected fat in a horizontal fashion. Tr. p. 878, In. 19 -
p. 879, In. 25; p. 552, In. 18 - p. 553, In. 3; Exh. 9. A tissue slide of this injection site in the right 
buttocks prepared in connection with this autopsy revealed: 
evidence of a bacterial process that's associated with an inflammatory reaction in the 
5 Dr. Kerr charted in connection with the visit that "Krystal's major complaint is discomfort 
to buttocks." Exh. 5 (7/23/10 post-operative note). He testified that he had no idea whether this 
prophylactic antibiotic would have been effective against the gram negative bacteria that was 
discovered in her right buttock following her death. Tr. p. 2257, In. 2 - p. 2258, In. 3. 
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subcutaneous tissues. It is horizontally placed parallel to the surface of the skin. It's 
composed of the types of white blood cells that show the infectious process has been 
ongoing for two to three days. And it does not show a direct path from the skin deep. 
It, rather, has been introduced parallel to the skin and deep to the skin into the fat. 
Tr. p. 559, In. 1-10. 
The bacteria found at this injection site was gram negative bacteria and pathogenic mean mg 
it had initiated an inflammatory response in Krystal's body. Tr. p. 560, In. 6 - 561, In. 25. This 
bacteria did not enter from the surface of the skin but rather had been injected through an inoculation 
deep to the skin at a horizontal fashion exactly as Dr. Kerr had injected it during the fat transfer. 
Id. at p. 560, In. 6 - p. 562, 11; p. 1982, In. 9-11. There was no bacteria or infection anywhere else 
in Krystal. Id. at p. 565, In. 20 - 566, In. 21. As succinctly stated by the district court: 
One of the most critical pieces of evidence was a slide made by the pathologist who 
performed Krystal's autopsy which showed the deadly infection inside a fat transfer 
injection site, with no tracing of bacteria from the surface of the skin to the infection 
point. If the infection had come from the surface, there would have been signs from 
the surface of infection. There was none. Krystal had nothing else medically wrong 
with her except the deadly bacteria injected during the procedure. 
R. 2661-62. 
The deadly bacteria Dr. Kerr injected into Krystal's right buttocks caused a toxic reaction and 
Krystal went into shock her blood pressure declined and ultimately all her systems progressively 
failed leading to her death from sepsis. Tr. p. 566, In. 22-p. 568, In. 14; p. 595, In. n-8, p. 880, n.15-
24; Exh. 8-9. Fat that Dr. Kerr injected in Krystal's right buttocks was contaminated with 
microscopic bacteria from non sterile reusable medical equipment used during Krystal's surgery. Tr. 
p. 340, In. 4-17; p. 342, In. 4-20; p. 3 76, In. 11-19; p. 382, In. 2 - p. 383, In. 23; p. 595, In. 1-8. 
Charles initiated the instant lawsuit for medical malpractice and wrongful death against Silk 
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Touch on March 16, 20 I 2. R. 13-20. The initial trial began on November 5. 2013. On November 
14, 2013, during the presentation of Silk Touch's case, the district court declared a mistrial after Silk 
Touch violated a pre-triallimine ruling. Tr. (11-14-13) p. 108, In. 24-p. 11 O. ln. 24. As noted by the 
district court in its written "Order Re: Costs and Fees," the mistrial was triggered by Silk Touch: 
when their witness blatantly disregarded the Court's in limine order barring purported 
evidence of a lack of prior infections. The 'evidence' of a lack of prior infections 
came from a review performed by Dr. Kerr's wife, who had no medical training or 
background, of undisclosed records of Silk Touch. The records were never disclosed 
by the defense to the plaintiffs in spite of express requests and represented an 
inadmissible 'summary' which did not meet any of the requirements ofIRE 1006. 
R. 2661-62. 
The district court spent "considerable time" addressing the issues associated with this 
"evidence." The district court noted Silk Touch had earlier violated another limine order pertaining 
to life insurance in questioning of Charles concerning insurance deductions on Krystal's Air Force 
paycheck but that violation "did not present the serious concerns caused by the grave misconduct" 
when the defense witness testified regarding a purported lack of other infections in violation of the 
limine order. Id. at 2662, 2666. A second trial scheduled to begin on April 8, 2014, was vacated after 
Silk Touch filed an "emergency" motion on March 28, 2014, requesting a reset of the impending trial 
date because Dr. Kerr was injured in a bicycle accident on March 19, 2014. R 2297-2301. 
Ultimately, the retrial commenced on September 16, 2014 and concluded on October 2, 2014, 
when the jury returned a special verdict finding that Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch breached the applicable 
standard of health care in the treatment of Krystal and that this breach proximately caused Krystal's 
death. R. 2508-09. The jury further found that Silk Touch's actions were reckless and awarded 
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economic damages of $2.540,436 and non-economic damages in the amount of$ l ,250,000. Id. The 
district court entered judgment in the amount of $3,790,436 on October 14, 2014. R. 2510-11. 
The district court thereafter considered the issue of costs and fees, including sanctions arising 
from the mistrial in November 2013. In a detailed written order, the district court explained it 
delayed ruling on the sanctions: ( 1) to fully assess the matter with the benefit of a compete record 
and "to assess, in colder light, what sanctions, beyond costs incurred, should be reasonably 
assessed"; (2) to craft sanctions in a manner which avoids unfairness to either side; and (3) "to 
preclude further delay in the retrial by defense interlocutory motions." R. 2664. 
The district court characterized Silk Touch's misconduct in causing the mistrial as the kind 
which "discredits the entire system of justice" and their overall conduct as "so outrageous that this 
Court ha[ d] simply not seen such a pattern of conduct in over three decades of trying complex 
cases." R. 2663-64. As discussed herein, the misconduct causing the mistrial was not isolated but 
permeated the first trial, continued during the second trial and even extended as far back as the very 
first hearing conducted in the case.6 In fact, during the second trial, lead counsel for Silk Touch 
Jeremiah Quane called Charles' counsel a "goddamn liar" in the jury's presence. Tr. p. 1865, In. 
23 - p. 1868, In. 6. Mr. Quane' s only defense was that he did not intend the jury to hear the insult. 
Id at p. 1866, In. 22 - p. 1867, In. 28. The district court admonished that Mr. Quane had been "very 
loud," "unprofessional," "uncivil" and "distasteful" and warned that if he "did it again," he would 
have to confer with co-counsel from another room during trial. Tr. 1868, In. 24 - p. 1869, In. 21. 
6 The district court assessed monetary sanctions against defense counsel at this hearing for 
their discovery abuse. See R. 202-203. 
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The district court ultimately determined that "in the cold light of further review, sanctions 
remain warranted." R. 2664. The district court entered a supplemental judgment in the amount of 
$143,696.21 on February 12, 2015 to reflect the district court's award of costs and fees including: 
(A) costs ofright under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l); (B) certain discretionary costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) 
largely related to the first trial; and (C) certain attorney fees associated with the first trial under 
I.R.C.P. 47(u) and the declaration ofa mistrial. R. 2661 -2674. 
Silk Touch filed notices of appeal from the above judgments. R. 2512-18, 2684-87. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Silk Touch identify the issues on appeal as: 
A. Err of the Court ordering a mistrial and awarding expenses and attorney fees against the 
Defendants as a result of the mistrial. 
B. The evidence of the Plaintiff on the proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard is 
insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict of the jury, including the insufficiency 
of the testimony of Drs. Sorensen, Nichols and Groben. 
C. Failure of the Court to instruct on elements of I.C. 6-1012 and 6-1013, refusal to give 
defense Instructions 11, 12 and 17 and err in giving Instruction 13 of the Court. 
D. The testimony of Plaintiff's expert Dr. Sorensen did not establish the required standard 
of care to establish the liability of the Defendants and the Court erred in failing to give 
Defendants Instruction 13. 
E. Err of the Court in ruling that Plaintiff's expert Dr. Sorensen did not have to familiarize 
himself with the community standard of practice. 
F. Err of the Court in giving Instruction 5 as worded. 
G. Err of the Court in failing to give an Instruction defining the standard of care that was 
stated in the Court's Instructions 8 and 9. 
H. Err of the Court in giving Instruction 10. 
I. Err of the Court to disallow the Defense to cross-examine Dr. Sorensen about his website 
and refusal to admit Defense Exhibits MM and NN. 
J. Err of the Court in ruling who establishes the standard of health care practice. 
K. Err of the Court refusing to admit Defense Exhibit Hin evidence. 
L. Err of the Court by refusing to admit evidence regarding the lack of infections of 
other patients and to admit Defense Exhibit AA. 
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M. Err of the Court in failing to give Defendants Instruction 28 and special verdict. 
N. The Court erred by making improper comments on the evidence and by improperly 
questioning witnesses which unfairly prejudiced the Defense. 
0. The Court erred in refusing to allow the Defense to challenge the foundation of Dr. 
Sorensen's causation opinions. 
P. The Court erred in allowing Dr. Sorensen to render opinions as to alleged differences 
between Dr. Kerr's deposition and his discovery responses. 
Q. Err of the Court by not allowing Dr. Stiller to rebut the opinions of Dr. Sorensen. 
R. The jury verdict must be reversed as the cumulative effect of the errors by the Court 
precluded the Defendants from getting a fair trial. 
S. The Court erred giving Instruction 18 and Question 3 of the Special Verdict. 
T. The Court erroneously solicited over 90 juror questions and failed to ensure adequate 
safeguards to prevent unfair prejudice to the Defense. 
U. The Court erred in allowing Plaintiff to utilize Dr. Kerr's answers to interrogatories which 
had not been disclosed pursuant to Rule 33(b)(2), I.R.C.P. 
Charles rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
A. Should this Court affirm the award of discretionary costs and attorney fees because Silk 
Touch fail to establish the district court abused its discretion in awarding costs and in finding the 
limine order violation deprived Charles of a fair trial and constituted deliberate misconduct? 
B. Must the judgment entered on the jury's verdict be affirmed because there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding that Silk Touch was negligent, reckless and proximately 
caused Krystal's death? (Appellants' Issues B, D, E)7 
C. Must the judgment be affirmed because Silk Touch fail to demonstrate error in the 
instructions to the jury or that any error requires reversal? (Appellants' Issues C, D, F, G, H, M, S) 
D. Must the judgment be affirmed because Silk Touch fail to establish an abuse of discretion 
7The Appellants' Brief lists twenty-one issues, many of which encompass more than one 
assignment of error while others involve the same legal issue as other issues. Thus, Charles lists the 
corresponding Appellants' issue(s) to the extent it may not be apparent from the issues' rephrasing. 
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m the district court's evidentiary rulings or that any error affected their substantial rights? 
(Appellants' Issues I, J. K. L, 0, P, Q) 
E. Must the judgment be affirmed because Silk Touch fail to establish a violation of any 
right to a fair trial or that alleged improper questioning by the district court effected the jury's 
verdict? (Appellants' Issue N) 
F. Must the judgment be affirmed because Silk Touch fail to establish a violation of I.R.C.P. 
33(b )(2) occurred in the use of Dr. Kerr's interrogatory answer at trial or that any purported violation 
constitutes a basis for reversal? (Appellants' Issue U) 
G. Must the judgment be affirmed because Silk Touch fail to demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision to allow the jurors to submit witness questions as permitted 
by the I.R.C.P. 47(q)? (Appellants' Issue T) 
H. Must the judgment be affirmed because Silk Touch fail to demonstrate error by the 
district court and the doctrine of cumulative error is inapplicable? (Appellants' Issue R) 
I. Should this Court award fees and costs under LC.§ 12-121 because Silk Touch's appeal 
is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Silk Touch support their appeal with false and misleading summaries of the record. They 
disregard the standards of review and ask this Court to second guess the jury, re-weigh the evidence 
and find that the district court abused its discretion. In many instances, Silk Touch fail to support 
their arguments with authority and complain of purported errors despite making no objection in the 
district court. They fail to cogently argue or identify assignments of error. This appeal is a 
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continuation of Silk Touch's conduct in the district court. where they repeatedly disregarded court 
orders, presented baseless arguments and caused a mistrial. This Court should affirm the judgments 
and award Charles attorney fees and costs in defending this frivolous appeal. 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs and 
Awarding Fees for Silk Touch's Violation of the Limine Order 
Following repeated violations of various pre-trial rulings and the district court's warnings 
that it would impose sanctions for further violations, Silk Touch's expert witness directly violated 
a pre-trial ruling prohibiting evidence of Silk Touch's alleged lack of prior infections. The district 
court declared a mistrial after finding that the violation deprived Charles of a fair trial. The district 
court further found that Silk Touch's misconduct was deliberate and ordered costs and fees 
associated with the mistrial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 47(u) and 54(d)(l)(D). 
The court may declare a mistrial sua sponte or on the motion of any party if it "determines 
an occurrence at trial has prevented a fair trial." I.R.C.P. 47(u). Further, if the court determines that 
a party or attorney's deliberate misconduct caused the mistrial, the court may require that party or 
attorney to pay reasonable expenses including attorney fees incurred by the misconduct. I.R.C.P. 
47(u); Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681,686, 39 P.3d 621,626 (2001). 
The district court has discretion to award the prevailing party costs, that are either not 
enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of, costs allowed as a matter of right "upon a showing that 
said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of 
justice be assessed against the adverse party." l.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(D). The party opposing an award 
under Rule 54( d)( I )(D) bears the burden to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion and, 
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absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will uphold the district court's avvard. Richard.! & Esther 
E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 186, 983 P.2d 834, 840 (1999); 
Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851,857,920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996). 
This Court applies the following three factors to determine whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise ofreason. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568,571, 149 P.3d 843,846 (2006); 
City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006). 
Silk Touch here challenge the district court's finding that their violation of the limine order 
deprived Charles of a fair trial and constituted deliberate misconduct. Silk Touch fail to establish an 
abuse of discretion and this Court should affirm the award of discretionary costs and attorney fees. 
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Silk Touch's 
violation of the limine order prevented Charles from receiving a fair trial 
The district court's detailed written order explains that "[t]he defense triggered a mistrial the 
first time this case went to trial on the first day of the defense case, after eight days of testimony, 
when their witness blatantly disregarded the Court's in limine order barring purported evidence of 
a lack of prior infections." R. 2662. The district court noted that the parties had spent considerable 
time discussing the evidence's admissibility on the first day of trial and that it had been excluded on 
various grounds, including failure to disclose the underlying data and lack of foundation. Id. 
On appeal, Silk Touch claim: "Incredibly, the district court did not even review the testimony 
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of the witness before granting the mistrial." App. Brief, p. 11. The record reflects the opposite. After 
Silk Touch violated the limine order, the district court excused the jury for the noon recess. Tr. ( 11-
14-2013) p. 106, In. 6-15. Before returning the jury to the courtroom following this recess, the 
district court advised that it had "reviewed extensively all of the orders and arguments in limine 
[from] the first day of the trial. And I specifically reviewed the testimony relating to the absence of 
other infections." Id. at p. 108, In. 24 - p. 109, In. 3. ( emphasis added). Silk Touch's contention the 
district court did not review Dr. Stiller's testimony before declaring the mistrial is false. 8 
The district court determined that Charles was prejudiced when Silk Touch implied it had 
no history of infections because there was "no credible evidence that there was a prior lack of 
infection because no medically trained person ever reviewed the purported records." R. 2663. Also, 
the "underlying data was never disclosed. It is not clear which results from which procedures were 
reviewed." Id. Charles "was seriously prejudiced" by Silk Touch's implication to the jury "that there 
was any legitimate, credible evidence of a lack of prior infections for the same procedure." Id. 
The district court made these findings after almost two weeks of trial. This Court evaluates 
whether the event which precipitated the mistrial motion represented reversible error in the context 
of the full record. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007). With respect to the 
first trial, the appellate record only includes transcripts of the limine hearing on the first day of trial 
8 Although Silk Touch did not object to the grant of a mistrial, they later claimed that Dr. 
Stiller's testimony did not violate the limine order in proceedings involving sanctions, 
notwithstanding Dr. Stiller's apology to the Court in the wake of Charles' objection [Tr. (11-14-
2013) p. 104, In. 18] and defense counsel's statement that "to the extent it came out, I' 11 take 
responsibility for it; he's my witness" [Id. at 105, In. 15-17). See R. 2053-55. Silk Touch do not 
appear to renew this position in this appeal. 
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and Dr. Stiller's testimony followed by the mistrial declaration nine days later. Thus, this Court 
cannot review the prejudicial effect of Dr. Stiller's testimony in the context of the entire record. 
As appellants, Silk Touch bear the burden of ensuring that this Court is provided a sufficient 
record for review of the district court's decision. See Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 
P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003). When a party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this Court 
presumes that the absent portion supports the findings of the district court. Gibson, 138 Idaho at 790, 
69 P.3d at 1051; Orthman v. Idaho Power, 134 Idaho 598,603, 7 P.3d 207,212 (2000). This Court 
will not presume error from a silent record or from the lack of a record. Gibson, 13 8 Idaho at 790, 69 
P.3d at 1051; Brooks v. Brooks, 119 Idaho 275, 280, 805 P.2d 481, 486 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Accordingly, this Court must presume the trial proceedings prior to Dr. Stiller's testimony 
support the district court's decision. Silk Touch fail to establish error in the district court's finding 
that Dr. Stiller's testimony, which implied Silk Touch had no history of infections and thus did not 
cause Krystal to die from an infection, deprived Charles of a fair trial. Silk Touch did not object to 
the mistrial at trial nor do they now establish error in the district court's decision to declare a mistrial. 
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Silk Touch engaged 
in deliberate misconduct 
Silk Touch argue the district court erred in finding that they engaged in deliberate misconduct 
and, thus, that the award of fees and costs should not have been awarded under I.C.R.P. 4 7(u). 
Initially, the district court awarded costs associated with the first trial under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) in 
addition to under Rule 4 7(u). R. 2665-67. Specifically, the district court awarded trial costs and expert 
fees for the first trial, less the costs awarded as a matter of right to the prevailing party, in the amount 
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$48.121.51. R. 2666. The district court also exercised its discretion to award Charles' fees and 
costs for travel from his military duty station in Florida to attend the first trial, including lodging and 
meals, in the amount of$4,324.54 and for transcripts of the prior trial, in the amount of$1,664.75. 
Id. With each of these costs, the district court found that they were reasonable, necessary and 
exceptional and that justice required that they be borne by Silk Touch. Id at 2666-67. 
Discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) can include travel expenses along with other 
expenses and additional expert fees. RichardJ & Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 
133 Idaho 180,187,983 P.2d 834,841 (1999). Silk Touch offer no argument as to how the district 
court abused its discretion in concluding the costs and expert fees associated with the first trial could 
be awarded as necessary and exceptional costs under I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l)(D). Silk Touch has thus waived 
whether the district court erred in awarding these costs for failing to support the issue with argument 
and authority. See Martin v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161, 164, 296 P.3d 367, 370 (2013) (when issues on 
appeal are not supported by positions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered). 
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that Silk Touch engaged in intentional 
misconduct. The first morning of the scheduled trial, the parties spent considerable time discussing 
Silk Touch's proffered evidence regarding an alleged lack of other infections. R. 2662. Despite the 
explicit in limine ruling, Dr. Stiller directly violated the order by responding to Silk Touch' s question 
regarding the reason he opined that contaminated instruments did not cause Krystal's death: "Let 
alone the fact of that no pertinent or persistent infections in the office. There is no history of the fact 
that ... " Tr. (11-14-2013) p. 105, In. 5 - p. 106, In. 8. Silk Touch made no attempt to interrupt or 
redirect their own witness and, instead, Charles was compelled to object at which point the district 
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court excused the jury. Id at p. I 06. In. 9-12. The district com1 found: 
While the defense, Mr. Quane, engaged in questionable conduct during the trial in 
violating a different in !imine order, this violation was such grave misconduct that the 
Court granted a mistrial and indicated that sanctions would be awarded to, as much 
as possible, alleviate the harm caused by the misconduct. 
2663. The district court noted that it had intended to address the prior violation of an in limine order 
"by way of a cautionary instruction hut to imply, without any solid basis, that there was absence of 
prior infections was a level of deliberate misconduct which necessitated a mistrial." R. 2668. Silk 
Touch has not provided a transcript of the entire first trial and this Court thus presumes that the absent 
portions support these findings. See Gibson, 138 Idaho at 790, 69 P.3d at 1051 (this Court presumes 
that absent portion ofrecord supports the findings of the district court). 
The district court also considered that: 
Mr. Quane is an extremely experienced counsel. He was well aware of the length of 
time spent addressing the motion in limine, its critical importance and the reasons for 
the court's ruling. He has handled expert witnesses for decades. He should have been 
well aware of the risk presented when an expert who has not testified in any previous 
trial has based previous opinions on evidence that has been declared inadmissible and 
that was fundamentally flawed. The triggering of the mistrial was grave misconduct 
which gave the defense a significant and unfair advantage. It is the kind of misconduct 
which discredits the entire system of justice. The foundational rule of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure is that the purpose of all of the rules is "to secure the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P. l(a). The 
defense misconduct violated every aspect of the Rule. 
R. 2263-64. 
In this appeal, Silk Touch claim the district court abused its discretion in finding deliberate 
misconduct because they presented Dr. Stiller's affidavit in which he claims he was instructed to not 
discuss other infections. App. Brie[ p. 10, n.3. It falls within the province of the district court to 
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conflicting evidence and the district court's finding of deliberate misconduct enjoys substantial 
support in the record. See Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57. 61. 190 P.3d 876,880 (2008) (falls within 
district court's province to weigh conflicting evidence and this Court will not overturn findings of fact 
based on substantial and competent evidence even in the face of conflicting evidence). 
It is worth noting that some twenty-eight years ago, this Court's own comments concerning 
Mr. Quane's misconduct bear a striking resemblance to those of the district court in this case: "Mr. 
Quane's intentional, inflammatory, and unfair tactic to violate the statute and confuse and unfairly 
prejudice the jury should not be tolerated." Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628,643, 769 P.2d 505, 
520 (1987). Consistent with this history, Silk Touch's misconduct in causing the mistrial was not an 
isolated incident and extended as far back as the first hearing conducted in the case. See e.g. R. p. 202 
(order granting Charles' motion to compel discovery and awarding fees); R. 1742-1750 (Charles' 
response to Silk Touch' s misrepresentation regarding mediation); R. 1811-1814,9 1820 (repeatedly 
stating the testimony sought to be elicited within the hearing of the jury when objections were 
sustained by the Court, despite prior ruling against speaking objections and admonishment during first 
trial); R. 1817 (Mr. Quane rotating his chair to turn his back on the district court as it explained the 
necessity for the mistrial); R. 1821; Tr. (11-14-2013) p. 107, In. 21 - 108, In. 1 ( discussing prior 
violation of in limine order and district court's warning that another violation would result in 
sanctions); R. 2662 ( district court finding that prior to the violation triggering the mistrial, defense 
9Charles supported his motion for sanctions with a declaration of counsel swearing the 
description of events during the first trial set forth in the memorandum was accurate and consistent 
with his memory. R. 1812; Memorandum at R. 1815-1834. 
19 
had violated another order in limine barring reference to insurance when Mr. Quane engaged in 
extensive questioning oflife insurance deductions on Krystal's paycheck); Tr. p. 319, In. 2 - p. 320, 
In. 17 (during second trial, district court's admonishment that further reference to inadmissible 
evidence, which Silk Touch referred to in opening, would result in sanctions); Tr. p. 464, In. 22 - p. 
470, In. 14 (during second trial, attempting to elicit testimony barred by in limine ruling despite the 
fact the issue had been covered "pretty extensively"); R. 2409-2411 ( order regarding defense's use 
of unauthorized transcript during second trial); Tr. p. 1866, In. 2 -p. 1869, In. 21 (Mr. Quane loudly 
referring to Charles' attorney as "a god damn liar" in presence of the jury and Mr. Quane indicating 
he only intended for his co-counsel to hear the comment). The record establishes that defense 
counsel's repeated disregard for the district court's pretrial rulings and persistent efforts to undermine 
the fairness of these proceedings ultimately caused a mistrial at great cost and prejudice to Charles. 
Here, the district court delayed ruling on sanctions because "the kind of conduct engaged in 
by the defense in this case was so outrageous that this Court has simply not seen such a pattern of 
conduct in over three decades of trying complex cases." R. 2664. The district court thus determined 
that "a colder, more measured analysis would be prudent" yet "in the cold light of further review, 
sanctions remain warranted." R. 2664. In deciding to award the specific fees, the district court noted 
Silk Touch had a complete preview of Charles' entire case and "the defense can bill hourly and can 
recover its expenses regardless of outcome- not so the plaintiff, Krystal's husband, SSgt Ballard, had 
to come to Boise, obtain leave and stay here for two separate trials - a situation which should never 
have occurred." R. 2664. 
The district court perceived its decision as discretionary, acted within the confines of 
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applicable legal principles and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Silk Touch fai I to 
establish an abuse of discretion in determining that its intentional misconduct deprived Charles of a 
fair trial and the award offees and costs set forth in the supplemental judgment should be affirmed. 10 
B. Sufficient Evidence Was Presented For The Jury To Reasonably Conclude That Silk 
Touch's Negligent and Reckless Conduct Was the Proximate Cause of Krystal's Death 
In a suit alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached a 
duty and that this breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg 'l Med. 
Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 783, 25 P.3d 88, 96 (2001). Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 require the 
applicable standard of care, and the failure to meet such standard be established "by direct expert 
testimony." On the other hand, the plaintiff can establish proximate cause through a chain of 
circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally 
inferable. Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 783, 25 P.3d at 96. 
In this appeal, Silk Touch claim that Charles presented insufficient evidence to establish that 
Dr. Sorensen was familiar with the applicable standard of care, that Silk Touch failed to comply with 
that standard, and that their breach of the standard caused Krystal's death. However, issues of fact are 
questions for the jury, and the jury's verdict on such matters will not, in most instances, be disturbed 
on appeal. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 572, 149 P.3d 843, 847 (2006); Garrett Freightlines, 
Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 722, 726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987). This Court 
construes the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial. 
10 Awarding costs and fees under I.R.C.P. 3 7(e) (sanctions for failure to comply with an order) 
also would have been appropriate as Charles argued in the district court. R. 1825. 
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Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 19, 278 P.3d 415, 421 (2012): Garrett Freight lines, 
Inc., 112 Idaho at 726, 735 P.2d at 1037. This Court will only disturb a jury verdict on appeal if it 
concludes the verdict is unsupported by substantial competent evidence or against the clear weight 
of the evidence, and that reasonable minds could not differ concerning the issues of negligence or 
causation. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 112 Idaho at 726, 735 P.2d at 1037. Conflicts in the evidence 
and conflicts in the conclusions to be reached from the evidence remain questions for the trier of facts. 
Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100,103,254 P.3d 1, 4 (2011). 
Despite these well-established standards, Silk Touch support their arguments by focusing on 
isolated evidence with no discussion of the evidence supporting the verdict. This Court should decline 
their invitation to re-weigh the evidence and affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict. 
1. Dr. Sorensen established familiarity with the applicable standard of care 
A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must affirmatively prove the defendant negligently 
failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care 
allegedly was or should have been provided by direct expert testimony. LC. § 6-1012. The applicable 
community standard is as it existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence, with respect to 
the class of health care provider which the defendant "belonged to and in which capacity he, she or 
it was functioning." Id Such individual health care providers must be judged by comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account 
his or her training, experience, and any fields of medical specialization. Id. 
An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must establish 
the manner in which he became familiar with the standard for the particular health care professional 
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in the relevant community and at the relevant time. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med Ctr., 13 7 
Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Perry v. Magic Valley Reg 'l Med Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 
P.2d 816 (2000). The obligation to demonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard of care is not 
an overly burdensome requirement. Mattox v. Life Care Centers of Am., Inc., 157 Idaho 468,474,337 
P.3d 627,633 (2014); Frankv. E. Shoshone Hosp., 114 Idaho 480,482, 757 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1988). 
This Court "has recognized that 'governmental regulation, development of regional and national 
provider organizations, and greater access to the flow of medical information,' have provided 'various 
avenues by which a plaintiff may proceed to establish a standard of care .... "' Mattox, 15 7 Idaho at 
474,337P.3dat633,citingSuhadolnikv. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 121,254P.3d 11,22(2011). 
Here, Dr. Sorensen explained he became familiar with the standard of care for cleaning, 
disinfecting and sterilizing reusable medical equipment used for surgeries conducted in physician's 
offices during his role over the past eight years inspecting physicians' offices throughout Ada County, 
who elected to voluntarily undergo certification. Tr. p. 332, In. 4-p. 333, In. 23; 334, In. 1-5. p. 513, 
In. 14-22. Additionally, over his twenty-five years practicing as a cosmetic surgeon in Ada County, 
Dr. Sorensen personally performed cosmetic surgery and worked alongside physicians from a number 
of specialities. Id. at 322, In. 8 - p. 323, In. 8; p.326, In. 20 - 327, In. 15; 331, In. 23 - p. 332, In. 3; 
p. 327, In. 4-10. Dr. Sorensen personally observed his partner, Dr. Craig Bass, perform numerous fat 
transfers, including during 2010, and followed Dr. Bass' patients following the procedure. Tr. p. 344, 
In. 1-16, p. 345, In. 19-22. When working with other surgeons, Dr. Sorensen observed the sterilization 
procedures for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable equipment. Id. at p. 334, In. 6-12. 
Silk Touch nonetheless claim on appeal that Dr. Sorensen did not establish he had "actual 
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knowledge" of"the care typically provided under similar circumstances" to "enable him to compare 
Dr. Kerr with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the community, taking into 
account his training, experience and field of medical specialization required by LC. 6-1012." App. 
Brief, p. 36. Silk Touch claim Dr. Sorensen's opinions were directed at what "should be done and the 
requirements imposed by others, like the [U.S. Center for Disease Control ("CDC")], Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare and manufacturer of the equipment used by Dr. Kerr." Id. Silk 
Touch misrepresent the record and specifically, Dr. Sorensen's testimony. 
Dr. Sorensen did not testify that a facility's certification that relied on standards set by the 
CDC, for example, was required but rather, was voluntary and generally most Ada County physicians 
performing surgery in their offices chose to do this even though not required "because it's a safe thing 
to do." Tr. p. 513, In. 14-22. Dr. Sorensen concluded that there is no difference in the standard of care 
with respect to accredited versus nonaccredited facilities in terms of the process for cleaning, 
disinfecting, and sterilizing their equipment. Id. at p. 335, In. 18 - p. 336, In. 21. Dr. Sorensen also 
opined that a physician or Med Spa, regardless of their certification status, should follow the 
guidelines published by their equipment's manufacturer and the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare, which are similar to the CDC Guidelines For Disinfection and Sterilization in Health Care 
Facilities. Id. at p. 340, In. 18 - p. 341, In. 3, In. 10-22. 
Standards of care are not "firmly rooted in past medical practices" and, instead, "are sensitive 
to evolving changes in the way health care services are delivered in the various communities of our 
State." Jv/attox, 157 Idaho at 474,337 P.3d at 633. While unexcused violations of pertinent rules 11 
may not appropriately define the standard of care in a medical malpractice suit. they may still be 
relevant to whether providers were negligent. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 186, 219 P.3d 11 92, 
1202 (2009). Dr. Sorensen's detailed testimony regarding governmental standards, certification 
processes, inspection of facilities, and personal experience practicing as a cosmetic surgeon and 
practicing alongside physicians of a variety of specialties were recognized methods to establish he 
was sufficiently familiar with the relevant standard of care. 
Silk Touch suggest that Dr. Sorensen's testimony was not sufficient "as a matter of law" 
because Dr. Sorensen was trained in plastic surgery whereas Dr. Kerr was an anesthesiologist 
practicing cosmetic surgery and Dr. Sorensen failed to establish knowledge that "Dr. Kerr failed to 
use reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and application of his learning." App. 
Brief p. 34-38 ( emphasis in original). To the contrary, Dr. Sorensen familiarized himself with Silk 
Touch's practices by reviewing the depositions and discovery response of Dr. Kerr and the 
depositions of Dr. Kerr's wife and other Silk Touch employees as well as the pertinent medical 
11 Silk Touch also suggest that pursuant to I.C. § 6-1014, Dr. Sorensen's opinions on the 
standard of care have no legal efficacy or validity, do not establish a standard of care and cannot be 
relied upon to support the decision of the jury. App. Brief, p. 3 8-3 9. Section 6-1014 has no bearing 
on this case. The statute provides: "no criteria, guideline, standard or other metric established or 
imposed by the patient protection and affordable care act ... or pursuant to any other law or 
regulation of the United States or any entity or agency thereof and used for the purpose of 
determining reimbursement or a rate of reimbursement for the care provided, or established or 
imposed by another state or by a third party payor, shall be used as a basis for establishing an 
applicable community standard of care." I.C. § 6-1014 (emphasis added). Dr. Sorensen discussed 
one federal entity, the CDC, whose guidelines are substantially similar to those of the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare and are for public safety, not reimbursement. Tr. p. 346, In. 4-11. 
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records. p. 339, In. 12 - p. 208-340-1233, In. 14. 
Moreover, it is unnecessary for an expert witness to be of the same specialty as the defendant 
so long as the expert establishes he possesses actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care. 
Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474,337 P.3d at 633; Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,292, 127 P.3d 187, 
195 (2005). Dr. Sorensen inspected the sterilizing procedures in multiple physicians' medical 
facilities during the past eight years. Tr. p. 332, In. 20 - p. 334, In. 5. Dr. Sorensen performed various 
types of cosmetic surgeries during his career, including liposuction. Id. at p.326, In. 20 - 327, In. 15; 
331, In. 23 - p. 332, In. 3. When working with other surgeons, Dr. Sorensen observed the sterilization 
procedures for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable equipment. Id. at p. 334, In. 6-12. 
This evidence was more than sufficient for Dr. Sorensen to possess actual knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable equipment that applied 
to physicians, like Dr. Kerr, who performed cosmetic surgery in their offices. See Newberry, 142 
Idaho at 292, 127 P.3d at 195 (holding that an ophthalmologist demonstrated actual knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care for family practice physicians by practicing alongside family practice 
physicians, by providing and obtaining referrals, and by discussing patient care with them, though the 
ophthalmologist never explicitly asked about the standard of care); Grover v. Smith, 13 7 Idaho 24 7, 
253, 46 P.3d 1105, 1111 (2002) (holding that an out-of-area dentist demonstrated actual knowledge 
of the applicable standard of care by demonstrating familiarity with state licensing requirements 
governing the practice of dentistry). 
The evidence at trial established Dr. Sorensen was intimately familiar with the standard of 
practice for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable medical equipment that applied to 
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physicians performing surgery in their offices, including those performing cosmetic surgery, in Ada 
County. Silk Touch's contention that Dr. Sorensen's testimony was legally insufficient to establish 
the applicable standard of health care is entirely without merit. 
2. Sufficient evidence was presented that Silk Touch failed to adhere to 
the community standard of care 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 required Charles to prove that Silk Touch "negligently failed to meet 
the applicable standard of health care practice" of the relevant community "by a preponderance of all 
the competent evidence." A "preponderance of the evidence" is "evidence that, when weighed with 
that opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which results a greater probability of truth." 
Harris v. Elec. Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3, 105 P.3d 267,269 (2004). Ample evidence was presented 
from which the jury could reasonably conclude Silk Touch negligently failed to meet the community 
standard of practice in cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable equipment. 
Dr. Sorensen testified extensively regarding Silk Touch's failure to meet the applicable 
standard of care for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing the reusable medical equipment used on 
Krystal. See generally Tr. p. 339, In. 13 - p. 376, ln. 19. Dr. Ken- knew that the applicable standard 
of care and his duty to minimize Krystal's risk of infection required that he use sterile, reusable 
medical equipment and that failing to do so could lead to an infection causing sepsis and death. Id. 
at p. 783, ln. 17-24; p. 785, In. 12 - p. 786, In. 1; p. 789, ln. 2-14; p. 2246, In. 25 - p. 2248, ln. 4. Dr. 
Lundeby, a cosmetic surgeon retained by Silk Touch, similarly confirmed the standard of care 
applicable to Dr. Ken- in July 2010 required the delivery of sterile instruments to the place of the 
procedure. Tr. 1799, In. I 9-22. 
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Dr. Sorensen's testimony established that Silk Touch nevertheless breached the standard of 
care because they, among other matters: 
• failed to use an enzymatic cleaner in the sterilization process; 12 
• failed to verify the autoclave's lethality with biological indicators; 
• mixed clean and dirty areas; 
• used a mixture ofHibiclens and water to clean, sterilize and disinfect reusable medical 
equipment which is inappropriate; 
• neither performed routine maintenance or service checks on the autoclave nor kept 
inspection logs for the autoclave; 
• had no written policies and procedures for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing 
reusable medical equipment; 
• did not follow the sterilization recommendations discussed in the owner's manual for 
the reusable medical equipment associated with the machine used on Krystal. 
Tr. p. 359, ln. 7 - p. 363, In. 24; p. 365, ln. 17 - p. 368, ln. 19; p. 370, In. 18 - p. 374, In. 1; p. 792, In. 
25 - p. 793, ln. 5; p. 800, ln. 1-18; p. 820, ln. 2 - p. 821, ln. 10; p. 2243, In. 22 - p. 2244, In. 2. 
Charles presented ample evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude Silk Touch breached 
the relevant standard of care for sterilizing reusable equipment. 
3. Charles presented sufficient evidence that Silk Touch's failure to adhere to the 
community standard of care proximately caused Krystal's death 
A plaintiff establishes proximate cause in a medical malpractice case by demonstrating that 
the provider's negligence was both the actual and proximate cause of his or her injury. Coombs v. 
12 Defense expert Dr. Stiller confirmed the standard of care requires use of an enzymatic 
cleaner. Tr. p. 1614, ln. 10 - 14. 
28 
Curnrxw, 148 Idaho 129,139,219 P.3d 453,463 (2009). Actual cause is a factual question focusing 
on antecedent factors producing a particular consequence whereas proximate cause exists when it is 
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the negligent conduct. Id. at 139-40, 219 
P.3d at 463-64. Proximate cause in medical malpractice cases may be proven by showing a "chain 
of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally 
inferable." Id. at 140, 219 P.3d at 464. "The question of proximate cause is one of fact and almost 
always for the jury." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). 
In this appeal, Silk Touch isolate portions of the testimony ofDrs. Sorensen and Nichols and 
then claim this testimony, considered individually, is conclusory and does not directly establish the 
bacteria's presence on the instruments used in Krystal's surgery or that Dr. Kerr injected that bacteria 
into her right buttock. Silk Touch thus claim Charles presented insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's conclusion that Silk Touch's breach of the community standards of care proximately caused 
Krystal's death Their argument is contrary to the weight of evidence and meritless. 
a. Dr. Sorensen's and Dr. Nichols' opinions that Silk Touch caused 
Krystal's death have considerable factual support 
Silk Touch claim that Dr. Sorensen's and Dr. Nichols' opinions that Dr. Kerr introduced the 
gram negative bacteria into Krystal's right buttock during the fat transfer were "net opinions" and too 
conclusory to assist the jury. App. Brief, p. 16-18, 23. Silk Touch, however, do not cite to a place in 
the record where they moved to exclude the experts' opinions. See id. Further, while Silk Touch cite 
to an isolated foundational objection to Dr. Sorensen's causation opinion, they ask this Court to 
reverse the verdict because they allege there was no chain of circumstances upon which the jury could 
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reasonably infer that fat, which Dr. Kerr injected into Krystal's right buttock, had been contaminated 
with gram negative bacteria after coming into contact with improperly sterilized reusable medical 
equipment. See id. p. 19-20, 25-26. Thus, the question in this appeal is not whether the doctors' 
opinions were admissible under I.R. E. 702 but, rather, whether the evidence Charles presented at trial 
is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Silk Touch's failure to adhere to the 
community standard proximately caused Krystal's death. 13 
Once an expert's opinion is admitted, it is up to the trier of fact to weigh the opinion against 
any conflicting testimony and the jury's weighing of conflicting, admitted opinions will not be 
second-guessed on appeal. Coombs, 148 Idaho at 137,219 P.3d at461; City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 
Idaho 580-86, 585, 130 P.3d 1118, 1123-24 (2006). Instead of addressing the totality of the evidence 
heard by the jury, Silk Touch argue the evidence of causation was insufficient by isolating portions 
of testimony to support their contention that the opinions of Dr. Sorensen and Dr. Nichols are "net" 
and based on assumption. For instance, Silk Touch contend that Dr. Sorensen's answer to the 
following question on cross-examination "confirms" there is no factual evidence to support his 
conclusion that Dr. Kerr injected bacteria into Krystal's buttocks: "Isn't it true that there's no proof 
by any means of the fact that at the time of surgery these gram negative bacteria went into her body. 
Isn't that true?" App. Brief, p. 18. Dr. Sorensen's affirmative response to this broad and semi-
131n objecting to Dr. Sorensen's opinion, Silk Touch did not specify how the foundation was 
allegedly insufficient. See Tr. p. 342, In. 15. Thus, even if Silk Touch had raised the issue on appeal, 
their objection was insufficiently specific to allow this Court's review. See Hansen v. Roberts, 154 
Idaho 469,473, 299 P.3d 781, 785 (2013) (an objection that no proper foundation has been laid not 
sufficiently specific when it fails to specify how the foundation for the opinion was insufficient). 
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intelligible question does not render his opinions, which were supported by extensive testimony 
discussed elsewhere in this brief, conclusory. See also App. Brief: p. 16-1 7; p. 492, In. 9-24 ( citing 
Dr. Sorensen agreeing with defense counsel that he assumes Silk Touch injected the bacteria into 
Krystal's right buttock and then claiming this isolated response establishes there "was no factual 
evidence that Krystal's death was the proximate result of or caused by" Silk Touch's failure to meet 
the standard of care); App. Brief p. 21-22, n.6 ( claiming Dr. Groben's testimony that he was unaware 
how bacteria entered Krystal's buttocks "negated and voided" Dr. Nichols' thorough explanation of 
his opinion, which is misleading because Dr. Groben testified that the deadly bacteria was found 
exactly where Dr. Kerr injected the fat); App. Brief p. 22-23 (isolating Dr. Nichols' testimony that 
the only plausible way for gram negative bacteria to find itself deep into the buttock was the 
inoculation during the fat transfer and claiming the "balance of Dr. Nichols' testimony does not 
establish a factual basis for his conclusory causation opinion" without discussing content of that 
testimony or Dr. Groben's similar conclusion); App. Brief p. 23 ( citing Dr. Nichols' comment prior 
to discussing the significance of blood cultures "there is nothing apparent about how the bacteria 
was introduced into the buttocks" - out of context to claim that his opinion was conclusory). 
Silk Touch neither address nor acknowledge the facts relevant in this appeal - those that 
support the verdict and must be viewed in Charles' favor. Silk Touch's argument that Ors. Sorensen's 
and Nichols' opinions are conclusory is misleading and contrary to the record. 
b. Dr. Sorensen provided compelling evidence that Dr. Kerr used 
contaminated reusable equipment during Krystal's procedure 
According to Silk Touch, Dr. Sorensen's testimony describing their violations of the standard 
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of care lacked "factual testimony or opinions expressed by Dr. Sorensen which establish that the 
violations [sic] failed to effectively clean, disinfect and sterilize the surgical equipment used by Dr. 
Kerr in this case." App. Brief, p. 16. Silk Touch thus claim "there was no testimony or proof by Dr. 
Sorensen that bacteria was on the equipment used by Dr. Kerr which he alleges was not properly 
cleaned, disinfected and sterilized." App. Brief, p. 16. However, direct evidence is not required to 
establish proximate cause and the medical malpractice plaintiff need only show a chain of 
circumstances that allows the jury to reasonably and naturally infer the ultimate fact. Coombs, 148 
Idaho at 140,219 P.3d at 464; see also Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98. 
Dr. Sorensen testified in detail regarding the grave risk of contaminated instruments presented 
by Silk Touch's failure to utilize critical steps in the process dictated by the applicable community 
standard of care for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable medical equipment. This testimony 
established a compelling chain of circumstances allowing the jury to reasonably conclude the reusable 
instruments used in Krystal's procedure were not sterile and that fat harvested for the transfer became 
contaminated with the gram negative bacteria when it came into contact those instruments. 
Specifically, Dr. Sorensen testified that disinfecting cannulas with an enzymatic cleaner 
which Silk Touch failed to do - is critical because the enzymatic cleaner dissolves debris that feeds 
microorganisms sticking to the sides of the hollow tubes even after soaking and scrubbing with 
brushes. Tr. p. 352, In. 1-13. Dr. Sorensen explained that an enzymatic cleaner is the "key thing" in 
cleaning liposuction cannulas because the solvent proteinaceous debris can insulate bacteria inside 
the cannula allowing it to survive notwithstanding processing through an autoclave. Id. at p. 35 L In. 
3-13, p. 353, In. 5-13. Even Dr. Kerr's own expert acknowledged that the standard of care required 
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use of an enzymatic cleaner. Id at p. 1658, ln. 7 - p. 1659, In. 9 
Dr. Sorensen explained that verifying an autoclave's temperature is not enough because 
temperature alone can be insufficient to achieve complete sterilization. Tr. p. 3 70, ln. 15-22. Instead, 
the community standard of care requires physicians to use biological indicators (spore counts) which 
contain bacteria that is processed through the autoclave. Id. at p. 370, ln. 23 - p. 371, ln. 5. The 
survival of this bacteria reflects the autoclave is not functioning properly. Id. at p. 371, ln. 5-9. 
Biological indicators are the only process that directly monitors the autoclave's lethality and, because 
Dr. Kerr did not use them, he had no assurance his autoclave effectively killed all micro-organisms 
such as the deadly bacteria found in Krystal's right buttock. See id. at p. 3 70, ln. 15-22; p. 3 71, ln. 5-
15. Dr. Sorensen also analogized Silk Touch's practice of mixing dirty and clean areas to cutting 
uncooked chicken on a counter and then making a sandwich on that counter. Id. at p. 376, ln. 5-10. 
The nature of the fat transfer procedure established that Silk Touch' s breach presented a grave 
risk of injecting contaminated fat into a patient. During liposuction, Dr. Kerr suctioned fat out of the 
body, through the hollow cannula and handpiece, through tubing and into a reusable cannister. Tr. p. 
511, In. 4-16; p. 791, ln. 19-p. 792, In. 24; p. 1970, In. 4-21; p. 1972, ln. 5-24; p. 1972, ln. 5 -p. 
1973, ln. 17; p. 1984, ln. 4-12. From that cannister, Dr. Kerr drew the fat into syringes and used a long 
needle to inject the fat into the buttocks "through the skin and then fanning in a horizontal fashion, 
if you will, between the layer of the skin and the muscle." Tr. p. 511, ln. 4-11; p. 1982, In. 9-11. The 
autopsy report, which Dr. Sorensen reviewed, indicates the gram negative bacteria that killed Krystal 
was found deep within her buttock, where Dr. Kerr had injected fat only days earlier. Exh. 9. 
The most probable conclusion the jury could reach is that as a result of Silk Touch 's failure 
to adhere to the community standard of care, the reusable equipment Dr. KeIT used in Krystal's 
procedure became contaminated with deadly gram negative bacteria. The contaminated portion of fat 
was then drawn into a syringe and injected horizontal to the skin and deep into Krystal's right buttock. 
Silk Touch contend that Dr. Sorensen "did not identify any factual evidence that the patient was ever 
contaminated by any act or omission by Defendants" as Dr. Sorensen does not "clean or sterilize his 
own equipment and just assumes other people have done it properly." This assertion misstates the 
evidence. Dr. Sorensen also testified that when working with other surgeons, he observed the 
sterilization procedures for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable equipment. Tr. p. 334, In. 
6-12. Dr. Sorensen has also observed the sterilization procedures in many medical facilities and 
operating rooms in Ada County in his role inspecting medical facilities for accreditation, which he 
has done since approximately 2006. Id. at p. 332, In. 4 - p. 333, In. 23; 334, In. 1-5. Dr. Sorensen has 
walked through the St. Luke's Hospital Surgery Center facility in addition to the main hospital, "step 
by step to see how they proceed with caring for their dirty instruments, clean through to the process 
of packaging and utilization" including in 2010. Id at p. 336, In. 22 - p. 33 7, In. 16. 
There is considerable factual support for Dr. Sorensen's opinion that Silk Touch' s sterilization 
processes directly led to inappropriate sterilization, which resulted in an infection, sepsis and death. 
Silk Touch's argument that the evidence was insufficient is meritless. 
c. Charles presented substantial proof that Dr. Kerr infected Krystal 
As discussed above, Silk Touch appear to suggest Charles was required to prove proximate 
cause through direct expert evidence. However, "nothing in Idaho Code sections 6-1012 or 6-1013 
requires that proximate cause be proved by expert testimony ~ those statutes only address the 
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applicable standard of care and breach of that standard." Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140,219 P.3d at 464; 
see also Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98. Charles was only required to establish a chain of 
circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally 
inferable. Sheridan, l 35 Idaho at 786, 25 P.3d at 99. 
In addition to Dr. Sorensen's testimony outlined above, one of the most compelling pieces 
of evidence that Dr. Kerr injected contaminated fat was Slide B (admitted as Exhibit 21), which was 
a tissue slide from Krystal's right buttock created by the pathologist who performed Krystal's autopsy. 
See Tr. p. 553, ln. 4-20. Slide B illustrated an infectious process caused by gram negative bacteria that 
was horizontal and deep in the subcutaneous tissues of Krystal's right buttock that had been ongoing 
for two to three days. Id. at p. 555, ln. 25 - p. 556, In. 4; p. 556, In. 22 - p. 557, 1. 3; p. 557, In. 21-24; 
p. 559, In. 1-15. Dr. Nichols explained that if the bacteria had entered Krystal's body from her skin 
following the surgery, the slide would have illustrated evidence ofinfection traveling in a vertical line 
from the skin's surface to deep in the fat, instead of the horizontal line deep within the fat and parallel 
to the skin as illustrated by Slide B. Id. at p. 559, ln. 5-10; p. 561, ln. 2 - p. 562, ln. 11; p. 694, ln. 1-7. 
Dr. Nichols thus concluded that the deadly bacteria had been injected deep into the skin in a 
horizontal fashion. Id. at p. 560, ln. 6-9. 
In this appeal, Silk Touch grossly misstate the significance of Dr. Nichols' testimony arguing: 
"If Dr. Kerr contaminated the patient with bacteria as alleged, common sense dictates there should 
have been an identifiable infection tract from the outside going in where the fat was injected." App. 
Brief, p. 25; see also id. at p. 24, n. 9 ( claiming that the "totality of Dr. Nichols' testimony supports 
the proposition that Dr. Kerr never injected any bacteria into the buttock because there is no testimony 
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by Dr. Nichols of an entry point on the buttock for the injection of fat in the first place by Dr. Kerr"). 
Rather than support Silk Touch's position. Dr. Nichols' testimony directly refutes their 
suggestion that bacteria entered "buttocks through incision sites of bacteria [sic] that came from the 
colon of Krystal." App. Brief, p. 25. As Dr. Nichols explained, bacteria cannot swim and, thus, are 
either injected into tissue or move from one place to another by replicating. Tr. p. 673, In. 9 - p. 674, 
In. 5. Dr. Nichols specifically testified that the slide would have illustrated evidence of infection 
traveling in a vertical line from the skin's surface to deep in the fat if the bacteria had entered 
Krystal's body from her skin following the surgery. Id. at p. 559, In. 5-10; p. 560, In. 6-9; p. 561, In. 
2 - p. 562, In. 11; p. 694, In. 1-7. Dr. Sorensen explained that he would not expect to see a visible 
entry point with the deep needle sticks to inject the fat. Id. at p. 398, In. 9-22. Dr. Groben, who 
performed the autopsy, testified that the bacteria was located where the fat had been injected in 
Krystal's right buttocks. Tr. 878, In. 3-8. That the bacteria was found deep within the fat and parallel 
to the skin's surface - right where Dr. Kerr injected fat rules out Silk Touch's claim that bacteria 
somehow entered Krystal through a needle injection site following the surgery. 
Silk Touch's discussion of the prepackaged instruments used in the procedure - scalpels, 
syringes and needles and the absence of bacteria on Krystal's left buttock is similarly misleading. 
Charles never suggested that Dr. Kerr infected Krystal with pre-packaged equipment. Instead, Silk 
Touch breached the standard of care regarding cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing the reusable 
equipment used in Krystal's procedure. Moreover, the location of the infection in a horizontal line 
deep within the fat and parallel to the skin illustrates that the fat suctioned through improperly 
sterilized reusable ( critical) equipment was itself contaminated, not the pre-packaged equipment. Tr. 
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559. In. 5-1 O; p. 561, In. 2 - p. 562, ln. 11; p. 694, In. 1-7. The angle of infection matched the angle 
at which Dr. Kerr testified he injected the fat. Id. at p. 1982, 9-1 I. 
Silk Touch further attempt to misdirect the Court by suggesting the bacteria's location in 
Krystal's right buttock and not her left supports their position. App. Brief p. 17 (no evidence to 
'·explain or establish why bacteria were found only in the right buttock of Krystal at autopsy and not 
in any other operative site made by Dr. Kerr, even though the right buttock of Krystal was the last 
operative site made by Dr. Kerr"). Dr. Kerr did not indicate the fat used for the transfer was mixed 
or homogeneous and to the contrary testified that he does not "break apart the fat because we want 
that to be pristine as possible because we are going to transplant it." Tr (2014) p. 1380, ln. 13-16. 
Only that fat which contacted the microscopic bacteria was contaminated and the bacteria's location 
deep beneath and parallel to the skin surface - exactly where Dr. Kerr injected it is evidence that 
contaminated reusable equipment infected part of the fat Dr. Kerr injected into Krystal's right buttock. 
Silk Touch breached the standard of care for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing the reusable 
equipment used to harvest fat from Krystal's body to use in the fat transfer. As a result, fat which was 
injected deep into Krystal's right buttock was contaminated with deadly gram negative bacteria. Silk 
Touch' s misleading arguments on appeal are without merit. 
d. while not required, Charles presented substantial testimony ruling out 
other causes of Krystal's death 
According to Silk Touch, Charles presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict 
because Ors. Sorensen and Nichols did not sufficiently rule out alternate causes of Krystal's infection 
and they claim their causation opinions are based on a "mere temporal connection" between the 
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breach of the standards of care and Krystal's death. App. Brie[ p. 17, 25. Initially. Charles was not 
required to demonstrate conclusively and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence 
resulted in the injury. Sheridan., 135 Idaho at 785-86, 25 P.3d at 98-99. 
Nor was Dr. Sorensen's opinion based solely on the grave risk of contamination presented by 
the multiple breaches of the applicable standard of care. Dr. Sorensen reviewed Dr. Groben's report, 
which discussed findings that ruled out causes of death other than sepsis and which revealed the 
deadly gram negative bacteria at the surgical site in the right buttocks. 
Similarly, Dr. Graben, who conducted the autopsy, concluded that neither fat embolism 
syndrome nor a urinary tract infection caused Krystal's death. Tr. 858, In. 24 - 859, 1. 6; 862, In. 
16-20. Dr. Nichols also testified extensively regarding his opinion that Krystal died from sepsis 
caused by the bacteria in her buttock as opposed to other causes, including the differential diagnosis 
of fat emboli that Dr. Graben ruled out. Tr. p. 574, In. 14 - p. 575, ln. 6; p. 577, In. 4 - p. 579, In. 25; 
p. 583, In. 1-12; p. 657, In. 16-21; p. 687, In. 8-11. Dr. Nichols concurred with Dr. Groben that the 
results of neither urinalysis supported the diagnosis of a bladder infection. Id. at p. 584, In. 16 - p. 
589, In. 7; p. 589, In. 13 - p. 590, In. 12. p. 591, In. 2-20. While Silk Touch initially suggested Krystal 
could have died from a urinary infection or fat embolism syndrome during trial, they apparently 
abandoned this theory as evidenced by their decision to forgo presenting their retained pathologist as 
a witness and to omit mention of these as potential causes in closing argument. See e.g. id. at p. 301, 
In. 23 - p. 304, In. 25 ( opening); p.400, In. 3 - p.401, In. 19 ( cross of Sorensen regarding fat embolism 
syndrome); p. 462, In. 5 - p. 464, In. 5 ( cross regarding urinary infection). 
In addition to testimony setting forth a compelling chain of circumstantial evidence from 
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which the jury could reasonably conclude that Silk Touch caused Krystal's death, the jury heard 
substantial evidence ruling out other potential causes of her death. Silk Touch's claim that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict is entirely without merit. 
C. Silk Touch Fail to Demonstrate Error or Error Requiring Reversal in Jury Instructions 
Silk Touch raise several challenges to the jury instructions given in this case, including 
arguing the district court erred in rejecting their medical ma! practice instructions; erred in its 
instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, negligence and expert testimony; and erred in 
instructing the jury on the definition of recklessness. Again, Silk Touch's arguments are misleading, 
incorrect and contrary to both the record and the applicable standard of review. 
On appeal, the review of jury instructions is generally limited to a determination of whether 
the instructions considered as a whole- and not individually-fairly and adequately present the issues 
and state the applicable law. Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 
Idaho 716,724,291 P.3d 399, 407 (2012); Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 
173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (2002). This Court will not reverse based on an erroneous instruction so 
long as the instructions taken as a whole neither mislead nor prejudice a party. Lakeland True Value 
Hardware, LLC, 153 Idaho at 724,291 P.3d at 407; Robinson, 137 Idaho at 176, 45 P.3d at 832. A 
requested jury instruction need not be given if it is either an erroneous statement of the law, 
adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the case. Puckett v. Ver ska, 
144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937, 943 (2007); Craig Johnson, LLC v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 
142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). 
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The jury was fairly and adequately instructed and the district court did not err in declining Silk 
Touch's proposed instructions. Silk Touch fail to establish a basis to reverse the judgment. 
1. The District Court correctly instructed the jury regarding medical malpractice 
Silk Touch claim that the district court committed reversible error in declining to give their 
proposed instructions regarding the standards applicable in medical malpractice (Defense Proposed 
Instructions 11, 12, 13 and 17) and in giving other instructions they claim were inconsistent with I .C. 
§ 6-1012. App. Brief, p. 26-38. However, the district court instructed the jury regarding the elements 
of medical negligence and the community standard by utilizing the Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI). The 
jury instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately stated the law. Silk Touch fail to establish 
either error or prejudice. 
a. the district court's instructions patterned after IDJI 2.10.1 and 2.10.3 
adequately and correctly instructed the jury 
Directly patterned after the IDJI instruction titled "charging elements of medical negligence," 
the district court's Instructions 8 and 9 informed the jury: 
On his claim of medical negligence against Dr. Brian Calder Kerr [ and Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP] for failure to meet the standard of care, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proof on each of the following propositions: 
I. That Dr. Kerr [ and an agent of Silk Touch Laser, LLP,] failed to meet the 
applicable standard of care as defined in these instructions; 
2. That the acts of Dr. Kerr [and the agent], which failed to meet the applicable 
standard of care, were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3. That the plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
R 2491-92 (compare with IDJI 2.10.3). Similarly, Instruction 11 was directly taken from the IDJI 
instruction defining the standard of care in medical malpractice cases: 
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A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a patient has a duty to 
possess and exercise that degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and 
exercised by other health care providers who are trained and qualified in the same or 
a similar field of care who practice in the same community. It is further the duty of 
health care providers to use reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of their skill 
and the application of their learning. 
Dr. Brian Kerr and the defendants are health care providers within the meaning of 
this instruction. 
R 2494 ( compare with IDJI 2.10.1 ). The district court also instructed the jury following a discussion 
on the scope of Dr. Kerr's testimony during the trial that: 
The standard of care is the applicable standard of health care practice of the 
community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided as such 
standard existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence and of such physician, 
keeping in mind that individual providers in health care are judged in comparison with 
similarly-trained and qualified providers/of the same class in the same community 
taking into account his or her training experience, and 
fields of medical specialization. 
Tr. p. 2050, In. 22 - p. 2051, In. 8. 
Silk Touch do not claim that these instructions incorrectly state the law yet nonetheless argue 
the jury was not correctly instructed pursuant to I.C. § 6-1012 because the district court refused their 
proposed instructions. App. Brief, p. 26-41. However, I.R.C.P. 5 l(a)(2) recommends that trial judges 
used the IDJI instructions "whenever the latest edition ... contains an instruction applicable to a case 
and the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject" unless "the judge finds 
that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly state the law." Silk Touch 
support their argument with several cases that pre-date IDJI 2.10.1 and 2.10.3 and that found no error 
in instructing the jury on the requirements set forth I.C. § 6-1012 instead of using pattern, general, 
instructions. App. Brie[ p. 27-30. Silk Touch do not identify any cases finding error in the district 
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court's decision to utilize the pattern instructions for medical malpractice cases. 
Moreover, read as a whole, Defense Proposed Instructions 11, 12, 13 and 17 only include two 
concepts not addressed in the Court's instructions - that the standard of care must be proven "by 
direct expert testimony" and that the term "community" refers to the geographical area ordinarily 
served by the licensed general hospital where the medical care was provided. R. 2235-37, 2241. In 
deciding not to include this information in the pattern instructions, the Civil Jury Instructions 
Committee recognized that juries do not require that information in most medical malpractice cases. 
Despite Silk Touch's appellate claim that the district court "did not instruct the jury on the 
definition of the standard of care" [ App. Brief p. 3 7], the district court instructed the jury regarding 
the requirements of LC. § 6-1012 14 by using the IDJI instructions. Given the evidence, additional 
information was unnecessary. Accordingly, Silk touch fail to establish the district court erred in 
declining to give their proposed instructions. 
b. No reasonable view of the facts supports the theory that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish the applicable community standard 
Silk Touch claim the absence of an instruction defining the community's geographic scope 
may have caused "speculation and uncertainty ... and [was] misleading, because the jury is otherwise 
allowed to conjure up any definition of community it chooses." App. Brief, p. 31, n.13. Silk Touch 
claim prejudice since "Dr. Kerr testified he treated Krystal at his office in 2010 in Eagle at which time 
14 Silk Touch's discussion of alleged error in the jury instructions cite to J.C.§ 6-1013 and 
cases discussing that statute's foundational requirements for expert testimony regarding the standard 
of care. App. Brief p. 35-37. The admissibility of Dr. Sorensen's and Dr. Nichols' opinions is not 
at issue in this appeal or relevant to whether the jury was correctly instructed. Therefore, no detailed 
response to these arguments is required. 
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there was a hospital in Eagle - St. Alphonsus - which would be the closest hospital to the location 
where he treated Krystal. Tr. 2048, L. 9 - p. 2248, L. 11." Id. Silk Touch's assertion is without merit. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 defines the term "community" as "that geographical area ordinarily 
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or allegedly should have 
been provided." Of course, "hospitals in nearby towns can certainly be in competition with each 
other" and because people residing at one location may commonly use the services provided by more 
than one hospital, communities may overlap one another. Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169,176,335 
P.3d 14, 21 (2014), citing Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 35, 156 P.3d 533,536 (2007). 
Silk Touch suggest Eagle is a separate medical community from Boise and Meridian because 
Saint Alphonsus has a satellite hospital in Eagle. However, a hospital in Eagle does not preclude 
Eagle from being within the geographic area served by other licensed hospitals such as St. Luke's. 
See Ramos, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536 (the existence of a licensed general hospital in Idaho 
Falls would not preclude Idaho Falls from being within the geographical area ordinarily served by 
licensed hospital in Blackfoot). 
Even if reasonable to argue that the Eagle Saint Alphonsus rendered Eagle a distinct medical 
community from Boise, Silk Touch presented no evidence that the standard of care in Eagle differed 
from the rest of Ada County. Indeed, Dr. Stiller (Silk Touch's Moscow-based standard of care expert) 
spoke with Dr. O'Neil, "a family physician that practiced cosmetic surgery in the Boise area," to gain 
actual knowledge of the standard of care applicable to Boise in 2010. Id at p. 1523, In. 13 - p. 1526, 
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In. 6 (emphasis added). 1' Similarly. Dr. Lundeby practiced in Spokane, Washington but he 
familiarized himself with the standard of practice in "Boise in 201 O" during a conversation with Dr. 
O'Neil. Id. at p. 1786, In. 2-24. Dr. KeIT acknowledged advertising to the Treasure Valley to include 
Boise, Nampa, Caldwell, and surrounding areas. Id. at p. 2248, In. 11 - p. 2249, In. 22. 
Silk Touch instead argue that they were prejudiced by the absence of a jury instruction 
defining the community's geographic scope because "Dr. Sorensen ... gave no testimony or opinions 
on the care typically provided under similar circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider 
in the community at the time and place of the events in question." App. Brief, p. 36. Dr. Sorensen's 
testimony does not support this argument. 
Over the past twenty-five years, Dr. Sorensen performed most ofhis cosmetic surgeries at the 
St. Luke's in downtown Boise but also practiced "all the time" at the St. Luke's in Meridian, where 
a" huge percentage" of the patients are from the city of Eagle. Tr. p. 336, In. 22 - 337, In. l; p. 436, 
In. 2-8; p. 481, In. 22-25; p. 493, In. 24 - p. 494, In. 3. Dr. Sorensen directly observed the sterilization 
processes in physicians' facilities in and around Eagle during comprehensive, day-long inspections 
he had been performing for the past eight years. Id. at p. 332, In. 20 - p. 333, In. 25; p. 336, In. 12 -
p. 338, In. 2 Dr. Sorensen testified that there is no difference in the community standard of care 
between Eagle and Boise in terms of sterility practices. Id. at p. 337, In. 17 - p. 338, In. 2; p. 493, In. 
15Dr. Stiller spoke with Dr. O'Neil to gain an understanding of the standard of care applicable 
to cosmetic physicians in the Boise area. Tr. p. 1619, In. 7 - p. 1620, In. 4. Nonetheless, Dr. Stiller 
did not inquire whether Dr. O'Neil completed a surgical residency, the type ofliposuction machine 
used in his office, whether he personally sterilized equipment, whether he used an autoclave, whether 
he used spore counts and whether he has written materials describing the procedure for cleaning, 
disinfecting and sterilizing reusable medical equipment. Id. at p. 162, In. 3 - p. 1625, In. 15. 
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19 - p. 493, In. 20; p. 498, In. 13-19. 
Dr. Sorensen's testimony undisputedly established that he was familiar with the standard of 
care for physicians conducting surgeries in their offices throughout Ada County for cleaning, 
disinfecting and sterilizing reusable medical equipment. Because the jury only heard evidence of one 
community, the additional language in Silk Touch's requested instruction defining the community 
was unnecessary under the facts of the case. The district court did not err in using the pattern 
instructions to instruct the jury on medical malpractice. 
c. Silk Touch fail to establish the district committed reversible error in 
instructing the jury regarding expert testimony 
Silk Touch claim it was harmed because the district court's instructions did not provide that 
Charles had to "affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the 
competent evidence" that Dr. Kerr breached the relevant community standard. App. Brief, p. 27. As 
discussed above, that the pattern instructions do not include this language suggests the committee 
recognized the language would not always be required. In the instant case, the only evidence received 
regarding Dr. Kerr's breach of the community standard was by direct expert testimony and, thus, no 
instruction was required to assist the jury in deciding the issues before it. 
Further, Silk Touch acknowledge in this appeal that the district court indicated that the 
community standard must be established by direct expert testimony in the jury's presence. App. 
Brief, p. 27. Specifically, Silk Touch objected that Dr. Sorensen's testimony regarding Saint 
Alphonsus' s sterility standards was irrelevant and the district court ruled that it was relevant to 
respond to Silk Touch's implication that because Dr. Sorensen did not practice at Saint Alphonsus 
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in Eagle, he was unfamiliar with the standard of care that applied to Dr. Kerr. In the jury's presence, 
the district court then indicated that there "must be expert testimony by a knowledgeable, competent 
expert witness, that the witness possesses" professional knowledge and expertise, coupled with actual 
knowledge of the applicable community standard to which the opinion is addressed. Tr. p. 497, ln. 
18 - p. 498, ln. 4. Silk Touch nonetheless argue that the district court committed reversible error in 
not also including this information in the written instructions. 
Silk Touch further claims they were harmed by omission of the words "direct expert 
testimony" in the pattern instructions because the district court instructed the jury: 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on 
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider 
the qualifications and credibility ofthe witness and the reasons given for the opinion. 
You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it 
entitled. 
App. Brief, p. 27; R. 2496. This instruction is identical to the former IDJI 124 and the current Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instruction 345. Silk Touch imply that the instruction's removal from the current 
edition of the pattern instructions signifies it was disproved. App. Brief, p. 32. However, the 
introduction to these instructions published on the Supreme Court website explains that a number of 
instructions included in the first edition of IDJI were eliminated "as too specialized, too 
particularized, or too remote for inclusion in a set of pattern instructions.'' See IDJI Introduction. An 
instruction's removal does not mean it has been disproved and, instead, "means only that the topic 
is such that a manuscript instruction drafted expressly to cover the particular topic is more appropriate 
than an attempt to offer a pattern instruction." Id. 
Without citing to authority disproving the language, Silk Touch nonetheless claim the 
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instruction was a '·complete misstatement of the law" because it informed the jury it was not bound 
by any particular expert's opinion and the jury should instead determine the amount of weight to 
assign expert testimony. App. Brief. p. 29-30. Silk Touch assert the instruction is "absolutely 
contrary to I. C. § 6-1012" because it ''tells the jury they are not bound by the opinions of any expert" 
and "allowed the jury to decide the question of whether or not Defendants compiled [sic] with the 
standard of health care practice based on whatever the jury wanted." App. Brief, p. 31-33. 
Initially, there is nothing inconsistent with the propositions that the standard of care must be 
proven by direct expert testimony and that the jury should decide whether to be bound by a particular 
expert's opinion, which may conflict with an opposing expert's opinion. Moreover, the jury was 
instructed that "individual providers in health care are judged in comparison with similarly-trained 
and qualified providers of the same class in the same community taking into account his or her 
training experience, and fields of medical specialization." Tr. p. 2050, ln. 22 - p. 2051, ln. 8. The only 
evidence presented on the sterilization practices of providers with training similar to Dr. Kerr's was 
that of the respective experts of the parties. Thus, it was unnecessary to inform the jury that the 
standard of care must be established through expert testimony even if the jury instruction could be 
interpreted as urged by Silk Touch. 
Silk Touch claim that instructing the jury that it was not bound by the testimony of a particular 
expert "devastated the Defendants and deprived them of a fair trial" because the jury had the right 
under the instruction "not to be bound by the opinions of defense experts Drs. Kerr, Lundeby, 
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Coffman and Stiller." App. Brief, p. 31, 33. 16 Silk Touch's position that I.C. § 6-1012 requires the 
jury to believe their experts' testimony is unsupportable and the district court did not err by 
instructing the jury regarding that factors it could consider in determining the weight to assign the 
testimony of the respective experts in order to detem1ine which of those experts, if any, to believe. 
Indeed, Silk Touch asked the district court to instruct the jury that a witness with special knowledge 
may give an opinion and that the jury should consider the qualifications and credibility in determining 
the weight to assign the testimony. R 2231. Determining the weight to assign a particular expert's 
testimony, which may conflict with an opposing expert's opinion, is a necessary function of a jury. 
The district court correctly instructed the jury using the pattern instruction and did not err in 
informing the jury it could decide which experts to believe. 
2. The jury instruction defining circumstantial evidence was not erroneous 
During the jury instruction conference, Charles indicated that an instruction defining direct 
and circumstantial evidence would assist the jury in interpreting the evidence since, for example, there 
was no opp01iunity to test the medical instruments used in Krystal's procedure. 17 Tr. p. 2321, In. 21 -
p. 2322, In. 9. The district court noted that jurors generally "are not philosophy majors" and that it 
16 Silk Touch also claim the expert opinion instruction allowed the jury "to ignore, discount, 
or otherwise elect not to be bound by" Dr. Sorensen's testimony regarding causation. App. Brief, p. 
32. The basis of Silk Touch's alleged prejudice is unclear. In any event, LC.§ 6-1012 only requires 
direct expert testimony to establish breach of the relevant standard of care and not proximate cause. 
Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 786, 25 P.3d at 99. 
17 Dr. Groben, who performed Krystal's autopsy, testified that by the time his testing revealed 
an infection in the fat transfer site in the right buttocks, too much time had passed to test the Silk 
Touch instruments used on Krystal. Tr. p. 878, In. 22 - p. 879, In. 1. 
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would include an example of circumstantial evidence in an instruction that it had frequently given in 
the past. Tr. p. 2322, In. 6 - p. 23, In. 22. Specifically, the district court instructed the jury: 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that 
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the 
fact, by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. For 
example, if you see it snowing, you have direct evidence that it has snowed. If you 
don't see it snowing but wake up and find the ground is covered in snow, then you 
have circumstantial evidence that it snowed. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the 
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each 
is respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
R. 2488. 
Silk Touch contend the district court committed reversible error by including the snowfall 
illustration, which is not included in the pattern instruction. According to Silk Touch, the illustration 
unfairly prejudices them because telling the jury there is no distinction between direct and 
circumstantial evidence allowed Charles "to establish the fact in issue without supporting expert 
testimony." App. Brief, p. 42. 
The instruction was pertinent to the issue of proximate cause, which requires neither direct 
nor expert evidence and which Charles could establish through a chain of circumstances from which 
the jury could reasonably and naturally infer the ultimate fact. See Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 785-86, 25 
P.3d at 98-99. Moreover, while there does not appear to be an Idaho appellate case discussing similar 
language involving snow, other states have concluded the illustration was helpful in cases involving 
circumstantial evidence. See Thomas v. State, 350 S.E.2d 253,254 (1986) (trial court's snow analogy 
in circumstantial evidence instruction could aid the jury in distinguishing direct from circumstantial 
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evidence); State v. Kaszas, No. 72546. 1998 \VL 598530, at* 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. l 0, 1998) ( court 
did not abuse its discretion in using snowing example in instructing the jury and the import of the 
instruction was clear); State v. Cipriano, 21 A.3d 408,425 (R.I.2011) (holding that snowing example 
provided a clear example of proof by inference). 
According to Silk Touch, "just because there is snow on the ground doesn't mean it snowed 
unless there are facts that show it did not get there for some reason or than it even snowed." App. 
Brief, p. 43. Silk Touch thus urge that including the snow example was tantamount to instructing the 
jury to hold them liable based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. App. Brief, p. 44. Silk Touch 
appear to confuse the concept of circumstantial evidence with conclusive evidence. 
Evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is entitled to varying weights. Indeed, the 
instruction, taken from the pattern instruction, concludes by advising the jury that "each is accepted 
as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry." R. 
2488 ( emphasis added). The district court's instruction provided the parties with a common sense 
illustration through which they could discuss the inferences the jury "may" draw from the evidence. 
Further, Charles did not argue that the jury should hold Silk Touch liable on a claim of res 
ipsa loquitar. Charles presented substantial direct expert evidence that Silk Touch breached the 
community standard of care for sterilizing reusable medical equipment and he provided compelling 
circumstantial evidence that Silk Touch' s breach of the community standard resulted in contamination 
of the reusable medical equipment used on Krystal, which caused her death. 
The district court's common sense illustration of circumstantial evidence presented no risk 
of the jury concluding that just because Krystal died. Dr. Kerr must have violated the standard of care 
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and caused her death. Silk Touch fail to establish any error, let alone reversible error. 
3. The district court did not err by giving the pattern negligence jury instruction 
Silk Touch contend the district court erred in giving the pattern instruction defining negligence 
arguing the definition is inconsistent with the pattern instruction defining a medical provider's duty 
in a medical negligence action. App. Brief, p. 45-47; R. 2493. The district court used this instruction 
noting the IDJI instructions for medical malpractice that it had adapted for wrongful death use the 
phrase "medical negligence' in the preface and, thus, the term should be defined for the jury using 
the pattern instruction. Tr. p. 2349, In. 9-23. The district court did not err. 
There are only two specific pattern malpractice instructions - the elements instruction, IDJI 
2.10.3 and two variations of the community standard of care instruction IDJI 2.10.1 and 2.10.2- and 
those instructions are not meant to include all jury instructions given in a medical malpractice case. 
The pattern definition of negligence in IDJI 2.20 suggests that it is meant to be used in conjunction 
with specialized instructions such as IDJI 2.10.1 and 2.10.2. In addition to the definition of negligence 
included in the instruction given in this case, the pattern instruction includes the following, optional, 
bracketed language: "The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those 
circumstances. That is for you to decide." IDJI 2.20. The comment then explains: "The bracketed 
words may be omitted when specific instructions defining standard of care, such as statutory duties, 
are included." The standard defined in I.C. § 6-1012 provides exactly such a circumstance. 
Rather than being inconsistent with the general definition of negligence, the instruction 
defining the standard of care provides the additional information regarding the statutory definition 
ofreasonable conduct contemplated by IDJI 2.20. Silk Touch's argument that the district court erred 
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in including the pattern negligence instruction is without merit. 
4. the district court did not err by submitting the issue of recklessness to the jury 
The limitation of noneconomic damages in personal injury cases does not apply to "causes 
of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct." J.C.§ 6-1603(4)(a). Because the evidence 
introduced at trial could support a finding of recklessness, the district court instructed the jury: 
Willful or reckless misconduct, when used in these instructions and when applied to 
the allegations in this case, means more than ordinary negligence. Willful or reckless 
misconduct means intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where 
the actor knew or should have known not only that his actions created an unreasonable 
risk of harm to another, but also that his actions involved a high degree of probability 
that such harm would actually result. 
R p. 2501; Tr. p. 2351, In. 5-7. The special verdict instructed the jury to first determine whether 
Charles met his burden to prove that Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch negligently breached the applicable 
standard of health care and that their conduct was the proximate cause of Krystal's death. Then, if the 
jury found in the affirmative, it was instructed to determine "were the actions of the defendant(s) 
which breached the standard of care and were the proximate cause of Krystal Ballard's death, 
reckless." R p. 2508. The jury concluded that Silk Touch's conduct in breaching the standard of care 
and causing Krystal's death was reckless. Id. 
In this appeal, Silk Touch claim the district court erred by instructing the jury regarding 
recklessness because Charles' experts did not specifically opine their conduct was "reckless" citing 
Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11, 17,205 P.3d 660,666 (2009). App. Brief, p. 64-68. In Jones, this 
Court found no abuse of discretion in allowing two experts to opine that the conduct at issue reached 
a level of negligence they saw as reckless although the district cou11 did not allow the experts to 
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present their opinions or the legal definition of recklessness, only that they viewed the negligence as 
reaching a level they saw as reckless. Id. at 17, 205 P .3d at 666. 
The trial court's exercise of discretion found appropriate in Jones fails to support Silk Touch's 
argument in this appeal that an expert must always opine on the degree of negligence before the issue 
may be submitted to the jury. In Jones, this Court noted that courts may appropriately exercise their 
discretion in precluding an expert from testifying that conduct constituted a reckless disregard in 
situations where the expert is no more qualified than the average juror to conclude from the evidence 
what any of the defendants had actually perceived or understood. Jones, 147 Idaho at 17,205 P.3d 
at 666, discussing Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d 897, 903 (2005). Here, the jury was 
qualified to weigh the testimony of all the witnesses and determine whether Silk Touch's breach of 
the community standard involved a reckless disregard of Krystal's safety. 
Silk Touch also rely on Coombs to support their assertion that the district court erred by 
instructing regarding recklessness even though that case did not discuss jury instructions defining 
recklessness. Instead, the Coombs Court noted: "Although the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not require 
expert testimony to establish causation in medical malpractice cases, such testimony is often 
necessary ... 'because the causative factors are not ordinarily within the knowledge or experience 
of laymen composing the jury"' Coombs, 148 Idaho at I 40, 219 P .3d at 464, citing Flowerdew v. 
Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 170, 409 P .2d 110, 113 ( 1965). Thus, Coombs only supports the use of expert 
testimony to establish causation and does not support Silk Touch's argument that the expert must 
specifically opine whether the degree of negligence constitutes recklessness as that expert understands 
this term. 
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Here, Dr. Sorensen provided extensive expe11 testimony regarding the precise conduct 
underlying Silk Touch's breach of the standard of care and the combined specialized testimony of 
Drs. Sorensen, Groben and Nichols addressed how Silk Touch' s breach caused Krystal's death. The 
jury was qualified to weigh that testimony with that of other witnesses including Dr. Kerr himself to 
determine whether the breach described by the testimony was reckless. 
The other cases Silk Touch rely on in this appeal are similarly inapplicable to the issue at bar. 
See App. Briefp. 65-66 citing Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741,751,274 P.3d 1256, 1266 
(2012) ( where liability is disputed, an allegation of negligence is sufficient to put a defendant on 
notice that its liability will not be statutorily capped if its conduct is found to have risen to the degree 
ofrecklessness) and Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 187, 219 P.3d 1192, 1203 (2009) (unable to 
conclude that the failure to instruct the jury as to recklessness deprived the jury of the opportunity to 
evaluate expert's testimony or that the absence of an instruction otherwise prejudiced plaintiff given 
the jury's finding defendants were not negligent). 
Finally, contrary to Silk Touch's contention in this appeal, the recklessness instruction could 
not have confused the jury as to who bears the burden of proof. The jury was instructed Charles had 
the burden to prove Silk Touch failed to meet the applicable standard of care and his breach caused 
Krystal's death. R 2491-92. The jury only considered whether Silk Touch was reckless after the jury 
concluded Charles met his burden to prove breach of the standard of care and causation. The jury 
instructions, taken as a whole, do not suggest Silk Touch had to prove their conduct was not reckless. 
Silk Touch fail to establish the district court erred in instructing the jury on recklessness. 
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D. Silk Touch Fail to Establish Reversible Error in the District Court Evidentiary Rulings 
This Court will not disturb a district court's evidentiary rulings absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Mattox, 157 Idaho at 473, 337 P.3d at 632; McDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care 
Grp.-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219,222, 159 P.3d 856,859 (2007). To determine whether a trial court 
has abused its discretion, this Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, 
whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Perry, 134 Idaho at 50-51, 995 
P.2d at 820-21. This Court disregards errors made on evidentiary rulings unless the rulings were a 
manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and affected the party's substantial rights. HF.LP., LLC 
v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,686,339 P.3d 557,571 (2014); Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P .2d 
at 821. 
1. the district court did not err by permitting Silk Touch to question Dr. Sorensen 
regarding the standard of care 
In this appeal, Silk Touch complain of the district court's comments during a discussion on 
the relevance of Dr. Sorensen's conversations with physicians in 2006 and 2007. lnitially, Silk Touch 
claim the district court's comments prevented them from challenging Dr. Sorensen's testimony 
without identifying a specific adverse ruling. App. Brief, p. 39-41. Instead, they broadly allege: "The 
case Plaintiff presented at trial was foundationally deficient per the requirements of LC. 6-1012 and 
6-1013 and the verdict should be reversed." App. Brief, p. 41. 
'" It is well established that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal 
an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of error." Patterson v. State, Dep 'to/ 
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Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,321,256 P.3d 718,729 (2011), citing Krempasky v. Nez Perce 
County Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236, 245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010). Rather than reveal an 
adverse ruling, Silk Touch cite to a portion of the transcript revealing that the district court made the 
complained of comments in the course of overruling Charles' objection and allowing Silk Touch to 
continue questioning Dr. Sorensen about conversations that occurred before July 2010. On cross-
examination, Dr. Sorensen indicated his review of the circumstances leading to Krystal's death did 
not specifically include speaking with physicians in Boise, Meridian or Eagle about cosmetic 
procedures in July 2010. Tr. p. 473, In. 3-7. Silk Touch then inquired whether Dr. Sorensen spoke to 
physicians in 2006 about the standard in Boise for cosmetic surgeons. Tr. p. 474, ln. 10 - p. 475, ln. 
2. Charles objected arguing that questions regarding the standard of care in 2006 and 2007 were 
irrelevant to the standard of care in July 2010. Tr. p. 475, In. 5-6. 
Silk Touch argued such evidence was relevant because Dr. Sorensen did not interview 
physicians regarding the standard of practice in July 2010 as part of his review of this case and the: 
"law is clear. The information you base an opinion on has to be the date of the procedure." Tr. p. 475, 
ln. 13-21. The district court responded that Dr. Sorensen practiced in the relevant community and 
did not need to gain knowledge of the standard of practice during a given time frame by interviewing 
local practitioners in the same manner as an out-of-state expert. Tr. p. 475, ln. 22 - p. 476, ln. 1. The 





He doesn't know what the standard of practice is for a non-plastic surgeon 
who does cosmetic surgery. He has to learn it from someone else. 
Not really. 
Well, he does. 
He already testified -- well, anyway, you are certainly entitled to explore the 
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basis/or his opinion that Dr. Kerr didn't perform in July 2010 in accordance 
with the standard of care as it existed at that time. That's relevant. But I am 
unaware of any requirement that a person who practices in the local area and 
is familiar with the standards of care in the local area has to ... consult with 
in state people in the way that an out-of-state expert does. 
Mr. Quane: Well,just because -- let me say this. Just because you practice in Boise doesn't 
mean you know the standard of practice. 
Court: Okay. Well, I will certainly let you go ahead and explore the basis for his 
opinion that Dr. Kerr's performance did not meet the standard of care as it 
existed in Boise at the time the care was rendered, so I will give you some 
leeway to explore that. 
Tr. p. 476, ln. 22 - p. 477, ln. 2 (emphasis added). Silk Touch then elicited testimony from Dr. 
Sorensen indicating he spoke with two local physicians in 2007 and 2011 in connection with his 
inspection of their facilities. Id. at p. 4 78, In. 9 - p. 480, ln. 23. 
Accordingly, the record establishes that the district court permitted Silk Touch to continue 
their line of questioning and, contrary to their assertion in this appeal, in no way refused to "allow the 
defense to challenge whether Dr. Sorensen had the requisite actual knowledge of the local standard 
applicable to Dr. Kerr." App. Brief, p. 41. Silk Touch fail to identify an adverse ruling that forms the 
basis for an assignment of error. 
Nor did the district court incorrectly state the law during its ruling. An expert testifying as to 
the standard of care must state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care. Newberry, 
142 Idaho at 292, 127 P.3d at 195; Dulaney, I 37 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820. An out-of-area expert 
can meet the foundational requirement of personal knowledge regarding the local standard of care by 
inquiring of a local specialist regarding the standard of care. Dulaney, I 3 7 Idaho at 164, 4 5 P .3d at 
820; Perry, 134 Idaho at 51,995 P.2d at 821. An expert witness need not be of the same specialty as 
the defendant so long as the expert establishes he or she possesses actual knowledge of the applicable 
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standard of care. Newberry, 142 Idaho at 292, 127 P.3d at 195; Dulaney, 137 ldaho at 164, 45 P.3d 
at 820. Accordingly, the district court correctly stated the law in indicating local practitioners are not 
required to interview other local practitioners to obtain actual knowledge of the applicable standard 
of care. 
Indeed, the very case relied on by Silk Touch in this appeal, Newberry, undercuts its position. 
See App. Brief, p. 41. In Newberry, this Court rejected the defendant's argument that the actual 
knowledge requirement "dictate[ d] that such actual knowledge must in all cases be obtained by 
explicitly asking a specialist in the relevant field to explain the local standard of care." 142 Idaho at 
292, 127 P.3d at 195. Instead, inquiring with a local specialist is one method an expert witness may 
obtain such knowledge, "but it is not the only method." Id. In Newberry, the plaintiff's expert was 
an ophthalmologist who practiced in the same community where the defendant was a family practice 
physician. The ophthalmologist's professional interactions with family practice physicians in the 
relevant area at the relevant time, including practicing alongside family practice physicians, providing 
and obtaining referrals, and discussing patient care with them, provided the expert with the requisite 
actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care. Id. at 292, 127 P.3d at 195. 
Here, if Dr. Sorensen were considered of a different specialty than Dr. Kerr, 18 even though 
18 Silk Touch claim there were "vast differences" in the training of plastic surgeons and 
physicians practicing cosmetic surgery without a background in plastic surgery like Dr. Kerr. App. 
Brief, p. 40. The vast differences testified to at trial dealt with the number of cosmetic procedures 
that the surgeon must complete before being allowed to sit for boards. See Tr. p. 1507, In. 22 - p. 
1510, In. 8; p. 1766, In. 23 - p. 1768, In. 8. Silk Touch did not present evidence that the training or 
standards for sterilizing reusable medical equipment was "vastly" different for physicians practicing 
cosmetic surgery versus those trained as plastic surgeons. 
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both are cosmetic surgeons. Dr. Sorensen established extensive familiarity with the standard of care 
for physicians from various backgrounds conducting surgery in their offices in Ada County including 
the surgery performed by Dr. Kerr. Specifically, Dr. Sorensen practiced and interacted with numerous 
physicians including cosmetic surgeons during his twenty five years practicing cosmetic surgery and 
eight years inspecting physicians' facilities in Ada County. Tr. p. 334, ln. 1-12. p. 336, In. 12-21. 
Finally, even if the district court's comment was incorrect, it was made during the course of 
an evidentiary ruling rather than as an instruction to the jury. The jury was specifically instructed that 
the district court's evidentiary rulings were not intended as an opinion concerning the evidence. R. 
2482. This Court presumes that the jury followed the jury instructions in arriving at their verdict. 
Phillips, 151 Idaho at 109, 254 P.3d at 1 O; Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 
149 Idaho 299,335,233 P.3d 1221, 1257 (2010). 
The district court correctly stated the law during the course of overruling Charles' objection 
and permitting Silk Touch to continue asking Dr. Sorensen about conversations he had with other 
providers. Silk Touch fail to establish a basis for reversing the verdict. 
2. the district court did not err in ruling Dr. Kerr could opine regarding the 
standard of care and the legal definition would be in a jury instruction 
Defense counsel inquired of Dr. Kerr at trial: "In your opinion, Doctor, who establishes the 
standard of health care practice." Tr. p. 2 049, In. 25 - p. 2050, In. 3. The district court sustained an 
objection that the question called for a legal conclusion and then clarified that Dr. Kerr could "say 
factually what goes into the standard of care, but the standard of care in Idaho is the standard of care 
applicable for a local community, which was a legal issue addressed in the instructions to the jury." 
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id. at p. 2050. In. 6-13. Defense counsel indicated "the imponant part of that is who establishes that 
standard" and the district court instructed counsel to rephrase the question." Id. at p. 2050, In. 16-21. 
The district court then instructed the jury: 
The standard of care is the applicable standard of health care practice of the 
community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided as such 
standard existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence and of such physician, 
keeping in mind that individual providers in health care are judged in comparison with 
similarly-trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same community 
taking into account his or her training experience, and fields of medical specialization. 
Id. at p. 2050, In. 22 - p. 2051, ln. 9. 
On appeal, Silk Touch argue this was "an erroneous and irrelevant reason for her ruling 
because the question asked who established the standard of health care practice." App. Brief, p. 49-50. 
Without specifying the aspects of the district court's comments that were allegedly erroneous, Silk 
Touch cite LC.§ 6-1012 and Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 335 P.3d 14 (2014) for the well-
established proposition that the standard of health care must be established by direct expert testimony. 
In Bybee, which addressed the foundation required for the admission of expert testimony under LC. 
§ 6-1013 for purposes of summary judgment, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding 
that whether Pocatello was within the geographical area ordinarily served by Idaho Falls was a legal, 
rather than factual, determination. Bybee, 157 Idaho at 176,335 P.3d at 21. The district court's ruling 
that Dr. Kerr could testify as to the underlying facts regarding the community standard but that the 
legal definition would be addressed in the jury instructions was consistent with Bybee. 
Nor was the district court's ruling inconsistent with J.C.§ 6-1012. The district court's 
comments in directing Silk Touch to rephrase the question described the community standard with 
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language substantively identical to the statute. Dr. Kerr then testified that neither Sound Surgical 
Technologies's Vaser system manual, the CDC, the State ofldaho, nor medical literature establish 
the standard of care, which was intended to rebut Dr. Sorensen's testimony that these resources help 
define the community standard. Tr. p. 2051, ln. 10 - p. 2052, In. 1. 
Silk Touch contend the evidence excluded by the district court's ruling was "apparent from 
the context" and they were not required to lay a further record. However, it is unclear what Dr. Kerr 
would have offered to rebut Dr. Sorensen beyond discussing the facts underlying his opinion 
regarding the community standard, including his apparent opinion that manuals for equipment he 
used, government health care standards and medical literature are not relevant to the community 
standard for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable equipment. 
The district comi did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Dr. Kerr could testify as to the 
underlying facts regarding the community standard but that the legal definition would be addressed 
in the jury instructions. Silk Touch' s arguments are without merit. 
3. the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that certain evidence from 
Dr. Sorensen's website was extrinsic and inadmissible 
In their opening statement, Silk Touch quoted extensively from a section of Dr. Sorensen's 
website cautioning the public against allowing non plastic surgeons to perform liposuction. On direct 
and cross examination, Dr. Sorensen admitted the website's contents and explained his underlying 
motivation in cautioning against non plastic surgeons performing liposuction. The district court 
declined Silk Touch's request to admit photographs of the website because Dr. Sorensen admitted 
their contents and extrinsic evidence was not permitted under rule I.R.E. 613 and cumulative. Tr. p. 
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11 - p. 430, In. 9, p. 523, In. 18-24. 
Rule 6 l 3(b) provides that "extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness 
is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the 
opposite paiiy is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice 
otherwise require." Silk Touch do not cite legal authority supporting the admissibility of photographs 
from Dr. Sorensen's website and do not even cite to IRE 613. This Court will not consider claims on 
appeal that are not supported with relevant argument and authority. Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 
801,806,317 P.3d 698,703 (2013). 
Rather than challenge the district court's legal conclusion, Silk Touch contend the 
"interpretation by the District Court of the direct testimony of Dr. Sorensen is not factually accurate 
in that the court erroneously concluded the direct testimony of Dr. Sorensen related only to plastic 
surgeons doing liposuction and no other physicians which is not accurate." App. Brief, p. 48. The 
precise meaning of this is unclear and Silk Touch support their position with a misleading recitation 
of the relevant procedural history. Silk Touch argue "it was Plaintiff's attorney who brought up" Dr. 
Sorensen's website while failing to inform this Court that Charles elicited the testimony to respond 
to their opening statement. See App. Brief, p. 48. 
Specifically, Silk Touch told the jury during opening: 
We will show you an interesting web page [Dr. Sorensen] puts out that was in effect 
last year. You will get a kick out of this. 
Here is what he says on his web page. This Dr. Sorensen. 
Unfortunately, there are a number of procedures being performed by 
physicians who are not trained in plastic surgery. These non-plastic 
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surgeons often utilize technologies that have catchy names and are 
expensive but in clinical trials have not shown any significant 
improvements over the standard tumescent liposuction techniques. 
Patients are advised to select a procedure that is safe and effective based on 
scientific results performed by board-certified plastic surgeons and to ignore 
the marketing hype so common today. 
He is broadcasting to the public, don't have this liposuction done by anyone but a 
plastic surgeon, and Dr. Kerr ain't a plastic surgeon. And this is the -- and he authored 
these words that I will prove. And this is the doctor they claim is going to prove that 
Dr. Kerr violated this standard of practice and he knows all about this stuff, even 
though he doesn't want anyone to go get liposuction from someone who isn't a plastic 
surgeon, and he says so right here. And if that ain't bias, I don't know what it is. 
Tr. p. 307, ln.21-24; p. 308, ln. 24 - p. 309, ln. 24. 
Dr. Sorensen responded on direct examination that he was familiar with the website and 
explained that when "Smart Liposuction came out" six or seven years ago "somebody of any 
speciality" would begin providing the service after attending "a meeting and then take a weekend 
training course." Tr. p. 330, ln. 20 - p. 331, ln. 18. After Dr. Sorensen observed undesirable results 
following such procedures, he warned the public via his website to ensure that a provider is qualified 
to perform. Id. at p. 331, ln. 10-18. Dr. Sorensen denied any bias towards cosmetic surgeons not 
trained in plastic surgery. Id. at p. 331, ln. 18-22. On cross-examination, Dr. Sorensen acknowledged 
adding the warning to the liposuction section of his website six and seven years ago and that he 
continued to represent himself as a plastic surgeon on his website. Id. at p. 425, In. 2 - p. 426, ln. 18. 
At that point, Silk Touch moved to admit and publish the photographs from the website and 
the district court ruled it was unnecessary extrinsic evidence because Dr. Sorensen agreed with the 
content "the point's already been made" and the website itself would be unduly cumulative. Tr. p. 
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428, In. 17 - p. 430, In. 9. The district court also found that Dr. Sorensen testified that he added 
information to his website because he believed that liposuction should be done by plastic surgeons 
and that there are problems with non plastic surgeons doing the procedure. Id. at p. 523, In. 12-17. 
The district court ruled the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not permit extrinsic evidence of a consistent 
statement, that extrinsic evidence is admissible under I.R.E. 613 to address inconsistent statements, 
and the evidence was cumulative. Id. at p. 429, In. 11 - p. 430, In. 9; p. 523, In. 18-24. 
The district court's ruling was correct and Silk Touch' s argument is misleading and meritless. 
4. Silk Touch fail to establish reversible error in the district court's ruling 
permitting redactions to Krystal's Silk Touch Medical Chart 
Krystal's Silk Touch medical chart was redacted in accordance with the district court's in 
limine rulings and admitted during the prior trial. Tr. p. 317, In. 4-10, Exh. 5. On appeal, Silk Touch 
claim the district court permitted redactions to certain portions of the chart on relevance grounds and 
then argues the ruling was error. App. Brief, p. 68-69. However, the transcript reveals no objection 
to this Exhibit Exhibit 5. Tr. p. 316, In. 24 - p. 3 I 9, In. I. 
Instead, Silk Touch support their appellate argument by citing arguments they made several 
days after the exhibit was introduced. Compare App. Brief, p. 69 citing Tr. p. 1392, ln. 2 - p. 1394, 
In. 22 with Tr. p. 1388, In. 3-13; p. 1389 - p. 1394, In. 22; p. 1403, In. 7-13. Specifically, on the 
seventh day of trial outside the jury's presence, Silk Touch indicated they wanted to discuss potential 
testimony to ensure they did not run afoul of the district court's prior in limine rulings. Tr. p. 1388, 
In. 3-13. Silk Touch argued that Exhibit 5 admitted without objection on the first day of trial 
should not have been redacted and that they anticipated testimony that Krystal was instructed to have 
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someone available to assist her for twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the surgery. Id. at p. 13 89, 
In. 13- p. 1391, In. 17. Silk Touch told the district court: "That's the issue I want to make sure that 
I'm not running afoul of everything, because it was redacted, and I want to be able to present that 
testimony, and we believe it should be included in Exhibit 5." Id at p. 1391, In. 20-24. 
After further discussion, Silk Touch indicated their point with Exhibit 5 was "whether or not 
that was a proper redaction, and whether or not [Dr. Kerr's daughter] can talk about how" Krystal was 
instructed to have someone available to assist her during the first twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Tr. 
p. 1403, In. 7-13. Charles' counsel noted that Exhibit 5 had been introduced during the last trial and 
Silk Touch should not be allowed to re-visit the ruling at that time. Id at p. 1403, In. - p. 1404, ln. 1. 
The district court indicated evidence of Krystal's self-care following the procedure was potentially 
relevant if it related to causation. Id at p. 1392, In. 22 - p. 1393, In. 5. The district court also ruled that 
Dr. Kerr's daughter could testify regarding the instructions she provided Krystal following the 
procedure but that if they intended to have a witness "leapfrog" from that information, they would 
need to address whether the opinion was previously disclosed. Id at p. 1405, In. 15 - p. 1406, In. 20. 
Later in the trial, Silk Touch offered an unredacted version of the Silk Touch chart. Tr. p. 
2103, ln. 13 - 2105, In. 3. Rather than find the information irrelevant, the district court indicated that 
the jury had already heard evidence concerning almost all of the information reflected in the 
unredacted chart. The "only narrow portion of Exhibit 5 that I excluded were some speculations and 
explanations" regarding Dr. Kerr's concerns that Krystal had not told her husband about the 
procedure. Id. at p. 2105, In. - p. 2106, In. 2. The district court noted that the jury was already aware 
that Charles was not home in the immediate post-surgery period and further evidence would be 
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speculative. Id at p. 2106, ln. 3-13. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
introducing a duplicate of Exhibit 5 was unnecessary given the jury was already aware of most the 
information redacted from that exhibit. 
Silk Touch do not appear to argue to the contrary and, instead, primarily complain of the 
initial redactions and sufficiency of the district court's findings in allowing the redacted exhibit. App. 
Brief p. 70-73. However, Silk Touch did not object at the time this exhibit was offered at trial and 
have waived any such objection. Moreover, Silk Touch did not include the district court's initial 
ruling in the appellate record. The party appealing a decision of the district court bears the burden of 
ensuring that this Court is provided a sufficient record for review of the district court's decision. 
Gibson, 138 Idaho at 790, 69 P.3d at 1051. When a party appealing an issue presents an incomplete 
record, this Court will presume that the absent portion supports the findings of the district court. Id. 
This Court will not presume error from a silent record or from the lack of a record. Id. 
Because the record does not include the district court's ruling admitting Exhibit 5 in the first 
trial, this Court presumes its evidentiary ruling was correct. Silk Touch fail to establish any abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision in the second trial to not admit a second version of the 
medical record, where the jury had been informed of most of the information therein through the 
testimony of witness. Silk Touch fail to establish reversible error. 
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Silk Touch's 
purported evidence of a lack of infection in other patients 
Silk Touch claim the judgment entered on the jury's verdict should be reversed because the 
district court excluded a spreadsheet, which purported to list other Silk Touch patients who allegedly 
66 
did not experience infections following various procedures. App. Brief, p. 86-93. However. Silk 
Touch only challenge one of the grounds underlying the district court's ruling that it would be 
irrelevant and do not even mention the district court's exclusion of the evidence for failing to 
disclose the underlying data despite Charles' explicit request. Silk Touch fail to establish an abuse 
of discretion and the judgment should be affirmed. 
a. procedural history related to "evidence" of absence of other infections 
Silk Touch' s "evidence" of a lack of other infections was based on a review of undisclosed 
Silk Touch records performed by Dr. Kerr's wife who had no medical training or background. R. 
2662. As set forth in his limine motion on this evidence, Charles served Silk Touch with discovery 
requests in June 2012, including requesting production of documents referred to in interrogatory 
responses. R. 885, 984-1002. During his deposition, Dr. Kerr initially testified that he believed that 
bacteria had been introduced into Krystal's body after she left Silk Touch, "Because I've never had 
another infection of that nature." R. 886, 925-948 (Dep. 82:11-25). Dr. Kerr clarified that a limited 
number of his post-lipolysis patients had experienced infections, and he admitted that he never 
formally tracked the number of post-surgical patients who experienced infections. Id. 
Seven months later, at the deposition of defense expert Dr. Coffman, Silk Touch first provided 
Charles with the summary at issue, which purported to list the first names of Silk Touch patients, their 
dates of treatment, and a brief description of the procedures performed. R. 886, 979-983 (Coffman 
Dep. 40: 19 41 :4, Aug. 20, 2013 ). Dr. Coffman reviewed no other information pertaining to these 
patients. Id at 41: 11-16. 
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On September 16, 2013 which was over a month after written discovery had closed, ten days 
after the deposition deadline had passed and less than two months prior to trial - Silk Touch served 
a supplemental interrogatory response disclosing, in part, that Susan Kerr's "expected testimony" 
would relate to Silk Touch records and "records and data she compiled of Silk Touch for infections." 
R 1027-1034. By letter dated September 20, 2013, Charles noted the vagueness of Silk Touch's 
supplemental interrogatory response, requested immediate production of the records and data 
compiled by Ms. Kerr, and sought a date upon which she could be re-deposed in light of the newly 
disclosed information. R. 1035-1037. On September 26, 2013, Silk Touch responded with a letter 
indicating that they were not required to provide the requested data and that Charles' request to re-
depose Ms. Kerr was untimely. R. 1038-1040. On September 27, 2013, Charles noticed the 
reconvened deposition of Ms. Kerr and requested that she bring all records and data underlying her 
testimony, as disclosed by Silk Touch's supplemental response to the interrogatory. R. 1041-1045. 
Silk Touch refused to produce Ms. Kerr to be re-deposed, and failed to further supplement their 
discovery responses to include any data or documentary support for the proposed trial exhibit. R. 888. 
Prior to the first trial, Charles moved in limine to preclude testimony concerning the alleged 
lack of other infections because Silk Touch failed to timely disclose the summary and refused to 
provide the information on which that summary was purportedly based. R. 874-911. The district court 
ruled that "as a general rule, one doesn't get into the absence of other accidents in establishing 
whether there was or was not negligence on a particular occasion." Tr.(11-5-2013) p. 21, In. 5-8. The 
district court ordered that the issue could be re-addressed outside the jury's presence "but the lack of 
disclosure of data underlying the summary presents a separate and considerably more serious 
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problem." Id. at p. 23, In. 23 - p. 24, In. 6; see also Tr. (11-14-2013) p. 109. In. 15-21 (failure to 
provide the data, which would support the conclusion, played directly into district court's decision 
to grant the order in limine with respect to the absence of other infection). 
Silk Touch then triggered the mistrial by intentionally eliciting testimony regarding the lack 
of other infections without first addressing the issue outside the jury's presence. Tr. (11-14-2013) p. 
106, In. 6-14; p. 108, In. 6-16. 
During the second trial, the parties sought clarification regarding the limine order prior to Dr. 
Kerr's testimony. Tr. p. 526, In. 1-14. The district court clarified that Dr. Kerr could testify about the 
number of procedures he completed to illustrate his experience. Id. at p. 526, In. 15 - p. 527, In. I. 
However, the district court reiterated that it continued to view evidence implying an absence of 
infections as irrelevant to whether Silk Touch was responsible for Krystal's infection. Id. at p. 527, 
In. 1-23. Charles responded that his objection went beyond relevance and that he has "never been 
provided the materials to verify whether there has been or has not been prior infections." Id. at p. 528, 
In. 8-18. The district court responded: 
Absolutely, which is one of the other bases for the ruling I made on the in limine 
motion, is that not only that, but you were never given the opportunity, which is 
fundamental when somebody offers a summary it's fundamental that the other side is 
given the opportunity to examine thoroughly the supporting data that goes into a 
summary. And so on so many grounds, as I previously said, this testimony is 
completely inadmissible. I have granted an in limine [motion], and I will take every 
conceivable action to make sure that that inference is not made. 
Id. at p. 528, In. 19 - p. 529, ln. 6. The district court clarified Silk Touch was "absolutely prohibited" 
from presenting the absence of other infections to prove no negligence but that Dr. Kerr discussing 
his experience during similar procedures did not implicate the in limine ruling. Id. at p. 528, In. 1-8 
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Silk Touch informed the district court they dispute Charles' assertion the information was not 
provided and inquired whether the district court would allow them to provide a response. Tr. p. 53 5 -
p. 536, In. 6. The district court noted that Silk Touch had ample opportunity to present new 
information and argument since the first trial and declined to reconsider its previous ruling. Id. at p. 
535, In. 9 - p. 536, In. 15. Eleven days later, Silk Touch presented an affidavit reflecting the date on 
which they initially provided the alleged summary to Charles in an effort to rebut their failure to 
timely disclose the information. R. 2417-2421. However, this information reinforced that the data 
underlying the summary had never been provided to Charles. See id. The district court indicated that 
the affidavit included "misstatements" about the prior ruling and that the issue had already been "dealt 
with ... extensively." Tr. p. 2106, In. 14-18. 
The district court declined to reconsider the issue and noted that while the lack of disclosure 
continued to be an important ground to deny the evidence, it was one of several grounds. Tr. p. 2106, 
ln. 19-24. The district court found that Silk Touch had failed to establish that the procedures listed 
in the summary were sufficiently similar to the one at issue for the evidence to be relevant. The 
district court also noted that the evidence could also consume undue time disputing collateral matters 
such as whether the prior patients actually did not become infected following the procedure and 
whether the procedures were sufficiently similar. Id. at p. 2106, In 25 - p. 2108, In. 22. 
b. the district court correctly found the chart was governed by I.R.E. 1006 
The district court correctly determined the chart was a summary governed by I.R.E. 1006, 
which allows the contents of voluminous documents which cannot conveniently be examined in court 
to be presented in the form of a summary. See Tr. p. 2107, In. 23 - p. 2108, In. 2; R. 2662. Before a 
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summary can be admitted under Rule 1006 ... the originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for 
examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place." Silk Touch neither 
challenge the district court's ruling the summary was governed by Rule 1006 nor do they contend they 
provided Charles with the records underlying that summary19 
c. the district court appropriately exercised its discretion by excluding the 
evidence based on Silk Touch's failure to disclose the underlying data 
The conclusion that other Silk Touch patients had purportedly not been infected was based 
on Dr. Kerr's wife's review of medical charts, which was not disclosed to Charles despite express 
requests. This lack of disclosure was a key aspect of the district court's ruling. 
The district court has the discretion to exclude testimony based on late disclosure as a sanction 
under I.R.C.P. 37(b). McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568,571, 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006); Bramwell v. 
S. Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648,651, 39 P.3d 588,591 (2001). The decision whether to exclude 
undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4) is also committed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 180-81, 219 P.3d at 1196-97; Viehweg v. Thompson, l 03 
Idaho 265, 271,647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct. App. 1982). This Court applies the following three factors to 
determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this 
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and 
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. McKim, 143 Idaho at 571, 
149 P.3d at 846. 
19 The summary refers to procedures before and after Krystal's surgery. R. 2428-2429. 
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In this appeal, Silk Touch do not argue that the district court abused its discretion by excluding 
the summary because they failed to disclose its underlying data. They have thus waived the issue for 
purposes of appellate review. Moreover, the district court correctly exercised its discretion in 
excluding the evidence based on lack of disclosure. Without the underlying records, the reliability of 
the purported evidence was highly suspect as there was no method to evaluate the similarity of the 
procedures or their circumstances. See Tr. p. 2107, In. 2-6; p. 2108, In. 1-6. The district court noted 
that a patient experiencing an adverse reaction would not necessarily return to Silk Touch and, thus, 
the absence of a note in the chart regarding an infection does not necessarily equate to the absence 
of an infection. Id. at p. 2108, ln. 7-11. 
Silk Touch do not claim they ever provided Charles with the underlying data. Their claim that 
this Court should vacate the judgment entered on the jury's verdict based on the exclusion of the 
summary is entirely without merit. 
d. Silk Touch fail to establish the summary's admissibility 
In this appeal, Silk Touch only assign error to the district court's exclusion of the summary 
on relevance grounds. However, the district court did not broadly rule that the absence of other 
infections would never be relevant. Instead, the district court ruled that to be relevant, a party must 
show the procedures and circumstances were sufficiently similar. Tr. p. 2106, ln. 24 - p. 2107, ln. 6. 
Such evidence tends to be "collateral and cumulative" and of little importance in most negligence 
cases." Id. at p. 2107, ln. 7-17. The district court ruled that Silk Touch failed to lay sufficient 
foundation and that the circumstances had not changed sufficiently to warrant the introduction of 
"very scantily vetted assertions." Id. at 2108, In. 19-22. 
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Silk Touch fail to establish that the district court abused its discretion by determining they did 
not establish the relevance of the summary reflecting an alleged lack of other infections. 
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that questioning Dr. 
Sorensen about the types of gram negative bacteria exceeds the scope of direct 
and is a topic that may be addressed through a different witness 
In this appeal, Silk Touch asserts that the district court ruled their questions regarding gram 
negative rods, including E. coli, were irrelevant and that they were prevented from questioning Dr. 
Sorensen about E. Coli. App. Brief, p. 59. Silk Touch again misrepresent the record. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Sorensen if there is one particular type of 
microorganism or bacteria that is most common within the definition of gram negative rod and Dr. 
Sorensen responded that he was unsure. Tr. p. 454, In. 23 - p. 455, In. 6. Defense counsel then asked 
Dr. Sorensen ifhe had knowledge where on the human body E. Coli flourish, inhabit and thrive and 
Dr. Sorensen responded in the colon. Id. at p. 455, In. 7-10. Charles objected that the question was 
outside the scope of Dr. Sorensen's direct testimony. Id. at p. 455, In. 10-12. The district court ruled 
that while such evidence might become relevant, Dr. Sorensen was not offered as a microbiologist 
and it would be more appropriate to address the topic with other witnesses. Id. at p. 456, In. 17-21; 
see also id. at p. 457, In. 4-7 (not the correct witness to address topic). Accordingly, contrary to Silk 
Touch's contention, the district court did not sustain the objection based on relevance. 
Silk Touch claim the district court's ruling prevented them from challenging Dr. Sorensen's 
opinion that the gram negative bacteria found in Krystal's right buttock was the result of Silk Touch' s 
breach of the community standard with respect to sterilizing reusable medical equipment. However, 
the record reflects the district court's ruling did not prevent Silk Touch from challenging Dr. 
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Sorensen's causation opinion. For instance, before the ruling at issue, Dr. Sorensen admitted he was 
not a microbiologist. Tr. p. 453, In. 19-22. After the district court's ruling, Silk Touch continued to 
question Dr. Sorensen about E.coli in general, including testimony that it is pathogenic when it enters 
sterile tissue, that a gram negative rod can thrive and live in the colon and escape the colon in stool. 
Id. at p. 457, In. 19-25; p. 461, In. 3-22. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the question regarding E. coli was 
outside the scope of Dr. Sorensen's direct and the ruling did not prevent Silk Touch from challenging 
Dr. Sorensen's opinion concerning the cause of Krystal's death. Silk Touch's claim is without merit. 
7. The district court did not err in allowing Dr. Sorensen to discuss the sterilization 
steps described in Dr. Kerr's sworn testimony 
In contradiction to Dr. Kerr's prior sworn interrogatory answer and deposition testimony, 
defense counsel told the jury in opening statement that Dr. Kerr "uses a detergent that has a 
compound in it called enzymatic fluid that kills and sterilizes equipment. He uses that like he always 
has." Compare Tr. p. 295, In. 11-14 with p. 365, In. 9 - p. 366, ln. 9. p. 358, In. 17-24; p. 362, In. 8-15. 
In this appeal, Silk Touch claim the district court committed reversible error by allowing Dr. Sorensen 
to draw on his expertise in the sterilization process to comment on whether Dr. Kerr's prior testimony 
was consistent with the use of an enzymatic cleaner. App. Brief, p. 60-61. Silk Touch fail to establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
Charles asked Dr. Kerr by interrogatory to identify and describe each procedure, policy and/or 
protocol for sterilization of each individual and/or piece of equipment which participated in or was 
used during the procedure on Krystal Ballard. Tr. p. 365, In. 9-16. Dr. Kerr responded: 
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Sterilization of all equipment, including handpieces and cannulas. Hand piece and 
hand piece cord wiped down with bacteriostatic wipe. All other equipment rinsed of 
fluids and debris, washed in hot water and Hibiclens and rinsed in hot clean water. 
Hollow instruments and cannulas cleaned with brushes and flushed with Hibiclens 
solution. Instruments evenly spaced and placed in autoclave cassette. New thermal 
sterilization placed on outside of cassette. Instruments autoclaved in Statim autoclave. 
Individual instruments not placed in cassette are place in autoclave pouches and run 
separately. Before use, sterilization markers are checked before opening cassette or 
opening autoclave packages. 
Id. at p. 365, In. 17 - p. 366, ln. 9. 
At deposition, Dr. Kerr testified that Silk Touch soaked reusable equipment in Hibiclens 
mixed with hot water and that he cleaned the handpiece with aseptic wipes. Tr. p. 358, In. 11-24. 
After the Hibiclens, Silk Touch used a brush to scrub additional debris from hollow instruments such 
as cannulas, rinsed the instruments with tap water and placed them in the autoclave. Id. at p. 3 61, 
In. 11-22. Dr. Kerr denied using "any type of other cleaner that is used in that process" before 
placing the reusable equipment in the autoclave and denied the "use any type of enzymatic 
cleaner in the process." Id. at p. 358, ln. 17-24; p. 362, ln. 7-15. Dr. Kerr did not mention a detergent 
or enzymatic cleaner in that deposition. Id. at p. 363, In. 15-24, p. 362, In. 7-15. 
In response to Silk Touch's claim at trial that Dr. Kerr used an enzymatic cleaner, Charles 
asked Dr. Sorensen to comment on whether Dr. Kerr's sworn interrogatory answer was consistent 
with his deposition testimony regarding how he cleans, disinfects, and sterilizes reusable equipment. 
Tr. p. 366, In. 10-14. Silk Touch objected, asserting the question called '·for a conclusion," the jury 
interprets the consistency of prior statements. Id. at p. 366, In. 17-20, In. 21-25. The district court 
overruled the objection stating it is "fair to ask an expert witness to comment on things relevant to 
the standard of care." Id. at p. 366, In. 17-20; p. 367, In. 1. Dr. Sorensen then testified that Dr. Kerr 
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described the same method of cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing the equipment at deposition and 
in his interrogatory answer. Id. at p. 367, In. 5-13. Silk Touch again objected asserting it was "a 
conclusion not for an expert witness." Id. at p. 367, In. 14-15. The district court overruled the 
objection but instructed the jury "it's always up to the jury to decide if something is consistent or 
not." Id. at p. 367, In. 16-24. Dr. Sorensen testified he did not see a reference to enzymatic cleaner 
or detergent being used in the interrogatory answer. Id. at p. 368, In. 9-19. 
Charles was entitled to rebut Dr. Kerr's claim that his sworn interrogatory answer and 
deposition testimony were consistent with use of an enzymatic cleaner. Moreover, because the 
interrogatory and deposition utilize terms outside the scope of the average juror's experience, it was 
appropriate to have an expert explain the reasons those responses were inconsistent with the use of 
an enzymatic cleaner. Silk Touch fail to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling. 
8. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that additional 
testimony from Dr. Stiller regarding Krystal's death would be redundant 
Silk Touch claim the district court erred by not allowing Dr. Stiller to rebut Dr. Sorensen's 
testimony. App. Brief, p. 61. The record establishes Dr. Stiller offered extensive testimony intended 
to rebut Dr. Sorensen's opinion and that in the ruling cited by Silk Touch, the district court 
determined further testimony would be redundant. Silk Touch fail to establish an abuse of discretion. 
Specifically, Silk Touch cite to their question near the end of Dr. Stiller's examination asking 
if he had "an opinion as to whether or not if Dr. Kerr had done everything the way Dr. Sorensen says 
he should have done whether Krystal Ballard would be alive today?" Tr. p. 1605, In. 16-20. Charles 
objected the testimony would be speculative. Id. at p. 1605, In. 21 - p. 1606, In. 2. The district court 
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agreed the testimony would be speculative and also found Dr. Stiller's earlier testimony covered the 
same ground in several different ways. Id. at p. 1606, In. 3-13. The district court thus sustained the 
objection because the question had been "addressed, asked and answered." Id. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value IS substantially 
outweighed by the danger of needless presentation of cumulative evidence. I.R.E. 403; Reed v. Reed, 
13 7 Idaho 53, 58, 44 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2002). Dr. Stiller testified extensively regarding his opinion 
that Silk Touch's failure to follow the standard of care would not have impacted the sterilization of 
the equipment. Silk Touch fail to establish an abuse of discretion. 
E. Silk Touch Fail to Establish a Violation of Any Right to a Fair Trial or Alleged 
Improper Questioning by the District Court Effected the Jury's Verdict 
Silk Touch claim the judgment entered on the jury's verdict should be vacated because the 
court made "improper comments in front of the jury and advanced partisan opinions on key issues 
which unfairly prejudiced the defense." App. Brief, p. 51. Silk Touch support this contention with 
strained interpretations and misrepresentations of the record. Further, while Silk Touch mention 
"plain error," they cite no authority to support their contention that a series of alleged errors to which 
no objection was made provides a basis for reversing the judgment in a medical negligence action. 
To the contrary, this Court has held that where an appellant fails to assert assignments of 
error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of 
error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Hopper, 155 Idaho at 806,317 P.3d at 703; Liponis 
v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010). A general attack on the findings and 
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, Is 
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insufficient to preserve an issue. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790. 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). 
An assignment of error not argued and supported in compliance with the Idaho Appellate Rules is 
deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
Application of this standard to Silk Touch's arguments on appeal and the facts set forth in 
the record reveal that the claim is without merit. 
1. The district court did not rule the community standard required compliance 
with certain guidelines 
Silk Touch cite an isolated comment out of context to support their contention on appeal that 
the district court stated there were certain CDC guidelines that were "absolutely required and 
mandatory to be followed." App. Brief, p. 51. Silk Touch focus on a single sentence of the transcript 
indicating the district court stated: "Well, obviously the jury is well aware of the fact that there were 
particular statutory and regulatory standards that were absolutely required for the sterilization of 
reusable instruments in cosmetic surgery." Tr. p. 1921, In. 9 - p. 1922, In. 23. The entirety of the 
district court's remarks and indeed the very next two sentences of the transcript, however, establish 
the district court intended to state exactly the opposite and that the omission of the word "not" before 
"particular statutory and regulatory standards" was either a reporting error or an obvious 
misstatement, which the district court immediately corrected. While not mentioned by Silk Touch, 
the district court's very next statement indicated: "Of course, that doesn't mean that they weren't 
supposed to be sterile they weren't supposed to be sterile. It just means that there weren't any 
pai1icular guidelines that were mandatory." Tr. p. 1922, In. 1-5 ( emphasis added). 
No witness for either party testified that any particular statutory and regulatory standard was 
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mandatory. That Silk Touch did not object to the district court's remark further reinforces that they 
understood the district court indicated there are no mandatory guidelines. Even if the district court 
actually misspoke by omitting the word "not," and the jury could have somehow understood that 
compliance with any guideline was required notwithstanding the district court's subsequent and 
immediate remarks indicating there "weren't" any mandatory guidelines, Silk Touch failed to 
preserve the issue for appellate review. 
2. The district court did not improperly comment on Dr. Kerr's credibility 
Silk Touch claim the district court improperly commented on Dr. Kerr's credibility during 
their attempt to convince the jury that he used an enzymatic cleaner notwithstanding his sworn 
deposition testimony and interrogatory answer reflecting otherwise. According to Silk Touch, the 
district court cut off defense counsel and took over the questioning. App. Brief, p. 53. Silk Touch 
did not object to this supposed misconduct at trial and cite no authority for the proposition that this 
Court should review such claims for the first time on appeal in a medical negligence action. 
Moreover, the transcript itself reveals that the so-called interruptions were in fact rulings in 
response to objections to the questions at issue. In the section at issue, Dr. Kerr testified that he 
interpreted the deposition question regarding the use of an enzymatic cleaner to refer to a very 
specific product labeled as enzymatic cleaner. Tr. p. 2061, In. 23 - p. 2062, In. 3. The district court 
sustained an objection that the following question was leading: "Okay and was that because of your 
interpretation of that question? Is that why you gave that answer." Id at p. 2062, In. 4-8. The district 
court rephrased the question and inquired "why did you say you used an enzymatic cleaner when you 
hadn't said it before?" id at p. 2062. In. 9-10. Dr. Kerr responded that while he had said he did not 
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use an enzymatic cleaner in his deposition, he had clarified during the prior trial that he used a 
detergent that contained an enzymatic cleaner. Id. at p. 2062, In. I 1-17. Defense counsel then asked 
Dr. Kerr regarding the number of pages in the deposition transcript and why he did not make changes 
upon review of the transcript. As the district judge overruled an objection to the question, defense 
counsel interrupted. Id. at p. 2063, In. 4-12. The judge instructed counsel not to interrupt and asked 
Dr. Kerr the same question posed by counsel: why he did not read and change his deposition 
answers. Id. at p. 2063, In. 12-16. Dr. Kerr testified he overlooked the correction in light of the 
length of the documents. Id. at p. 2063, In. 17-19. 
On appeal, Silk Touch claim the district court's re-phrasing of the question changed the issue 
from whether Plaintiff's counsel had even asked about an enzymatic cleaner during the deposition 
to the court implying the issue had been squarely asked in the deposition." App. Brief, p. 53. This 
argument is not borne out by the record. The excerpts of Dr. Kerr's deposition published to the jury 





As far as the Hibiclens and water, is there any type of other cleaner 
that is used in that process before [reusable equipment including 
cannulas] get into the autoclave? 
No 
All right. Do you use any type of enzymatic cleaner in the process? 
No 
Tr. p. 358, In. 17-24; p. 362, In. 8-15. In light of this testimony, Silk Touch cannot credibly complain 
if the district court's question "implied" Dr. Kerr had been directly asked whether he used an 
"enzymatic cleaner." 
While Dr. Kerr was entitled to explain his prior sworn testimony, he cannot pretend there is 
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an issue whether he was "even asked about an enzymatic cleaner during the deposition." Contrary 
to Silk Touch's claim that the district court expressed an opinion that Dr. Kerr had changed his 
testimony, the district court simply rephrased counsel's question asking Dr. Kerr to explain the 
obvious difference between the two varying accounts. Silk Touch fail to establish the district court 
commented on Dr. Kerr's credibility. 
3. The district court neither improperly questioned witnesses nor commented on 
the weight of the evidence 
Silk Touch claim the judgment should be reversed because the district court took over 
questioning Dr. Kerr and "prejudiced the defense" by "repeatedly" commenting on the degree of 
relevance of Charles' evidence. App. Brief, p. 54. Silk Touch objected to none of these purported 
instances of misconduct in the district court and their claims are unsupported by the record. 
Silk Touch claim the district court "needlessly took over the questioning" based on the 
district court's comments while ruling on an objection. During Dr. Kerr's cross-examination, Charles 
impeached his testimony that he did not pay attention when answering the interrogatory by asking 
whether he was aware at the time that a primary issue in the case was whether he appropriately 
cleaned, disinfected and sterilized the equipment. Tr. p. 2213, In. 21 - p. 2214, In. 11. Defense 
counsel objected simultaneously with Dr. Kerr's response that "he did not know it was the main 
criticism." Id. at p. 2214, In. 12-17. The district court overruled the objection. Id at p. 2214, In. 18. 
Because the testimony had been difficult to follow with repeated objections, the district court 
indicated "let's back up" and asked whether Dr. Kerr's answer had been that he "knew that it was 
important at the time of the interrogatories what the process of sterilization was that was used at the 
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you had the interrogatory'''' Id at p. 14. In. 18-23. Dr. Kerr indicated that he did not believe 
the question posed by the district court was the same question presented to him. Id. at p. 2214, In. 
24-25. The district court directed the court reporter to read the question and answer again because 
it had been difficult to hear. Id. at p. 2215, In. 1-7. 
Thus, the transcript reflects that the district court was uncertain of Dr. Kerr's answer because 
he and his attorney spoke over one another during the course of an objection. Silk Touch's claim that 
the district court needlessly interfered and "dramatically" had the court reporter read back the 
question is not supported by the record. 
Silk Touch also claim that the district court further "prejudiced the defense" by "repeatedly" 
commenting on the degree of relevance of Charles' evidence because in overruling three objections, 
the district court indicated the question called for "highly" or "very" relevant evidence. App. Brief, 
p. 54. Silk Touch did not object to the district court's characterization in the trial court and, in any 
event, the record reveals that the district court's conduct did not prejudice Silk Touch. 
On direct examination, Charles asked Dr. Kerr whether he was confused regarding the 
appropriate process for sterilizing reusable medical equipment as it pertained to his responsibility 
to follow the standard of practice. Tr. p. 779, In. 22 - p. 780, In. 2. Silk Touch objected, indicating 
that the "standard of health care practice is what controls" and the question was "irrelevant." Id. at 
p. 780, In. 3-6. The district court ruled that the question was "not irrelevant" and was "highly 
relevant." Id. at p. 780, In. 7-10. Dr. Kerr responded that he was not confused but he was unclear of 
how counsel defined "appropriate." Id at p. 780, In. 12-21. 
Similarly, Dr. Kerr testified that he was familiar with the CDC guidelines because he had 
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been present during Dr. Sorensen's testimony regarding those guidelines. Charles inquired how far 
in advance of the trial he had reviewed those guidelines and Silk Touch objected that the evidence 
was irrelevant. The district court overruled the objection finding the evidence "very relevant." Id. 
at p. 1858, In. 21 - p. 1859, In. 5; see also Id. at p. 2215, In. I 6-25 (finding whether Dr. Kerr 
understood that the criticism was that Krystal died of an infection because of unsterile instruments 
"highly" relevant in overruling relevance objection). 
Silk Touch supports its appellate argument with criminal cases holding that a judge's remark 
will be deemed prejudicial if it constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence or indicates an 
opinion of the court as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. See App. Brief, p. 55-57, citing State 
v. White, 97 Idaho 708,712,551 P.2d 1344, 1348 (1976); State v. Johnson, 138 ldaho 103, 106, 57 
P .3d 814, 817 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law and a comment on the degree of relevance 
is not a comment on the weight the jury should assign the response. Accordingly, the district court's 
comment that evidence would be highly or very relevant on three occasions over the course of the 
multi-week trial in no way prejudiced Silk Touch. See also United States v. Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d 
273, 277 (5th Cir.) opinion modified on reh'g, 624 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1980) (isolated incidents in a 
four-day trial in which there was ample evidence upon which to convict the defendant for his part 
in the marijuana conspiracy did not deprive him of a fair trial). 
Even if the district court's comments could be construed as a comment on the evidence, the 
district court instructed the jury that: "the production of evidence in court is governed by the rule of 
law. Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings were intended by me to indicate any 
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opinion concerning the evidence in this case." R. 2482. The jury was also instructed that the: '·key 
part of your job as jurors is to decide how credible or believable each witness was. This is your job, 
not mine. It is up to you to decide if a witness's testimony was believable, and how much weight you 
think it deserves. You are free to believe everything that a witness said, or only part of it, or none of 
it at all." R. 2486. This Court presumes that the jury followed these instructions. See Phillips, 151 
Idaho at 109,254 P.3d at 10. 
The district court neither interfered with the question of witnesses nor commented on the 
weight of Silk Touch's evidence. Silk Touch fail to establish any error, let alone any error that could 
be reviewed in the absence of an objection. 
F. Silk Touch Fail to Establish a Violation ofl.R.C.P. 33(b)(2) or The Use of Dr. Kerr's 
Interrogatory Answer at Trial is a Basis for Reversal 
Silk Touch claim the judgment entered on the jury's verdict should be reversed because 
Charles did not "disclose" Dr. Kerr's sworn interrogatory answer prior to trial. According to Silk 
Touch, "Rule 33(b )(2) specifically requires interrogatory answers to be identified in advance of the 
trial so opposing counsel can prepare for the very attack made by the Plaintiff in this case." App. 
Brief, p. 86. Silk Touch misconstrue the rule's meaning and purpose and, in any event, cannot 
credibly claim surprise or that they were unprepared to be confronted with Dr. Kerr's own sworn 
testimony made during the course of discovery in this case. 
As previously noted, defense counsel told the jury in opening statement that Dr. Kerr "uses 
a detergent that has a compound in it called enzymatic fluid that kills and sterilizes equipment. He 
uses that like he always has." Tr. 295, In. 11-14. Charles responded to that position by publishing 
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Dr. Kerr's prior deposition testimony and interrogatory answer, verified by him under oath indicating 
otherwise, during the examination of various witnesses, including Dr. Sorensen. Silk Touch initially 
objected, asserting Charles had not disclosed Dr. Kerr's interrogatory response prior to trial"[ u ]nder 
Idaho Rule of Procedure [sic] regarding the disclosure of any interrogatory use at a trial." Tr. p. 3 64, 
In. 8-10. The district court overruled the objection. Id. at p. 364, ln. 11-14. 
Rule 33(b)(2), now cited by Silk Touch on appeal, provides that if interrogatory responses 
are to be used at trial, "only those portions to be used shall be submitted to the court at the outset of 
the trial ... insofar as their use can be reasonably anticipated by the party seeking to introduce such 
evidence." The rule limits the interrogatory or response presented to the trial court to the 
interrogatory at issue, without inclusion of the surrounding interrogatories or responses. See also 
I.R.C.P. 30(f)( 4)(B); Brown v. Mathews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830,833,801 P.2d 37, 40 (I 990) 
(noting depositions are no longer physically filed with the clerk and on summary judgment only 
those portions of the deposition applicable to the existence of material facts need be submitted to the 
court). 
Even if the purpose of the rule is notice as urged by Silk Touch, they compelled the use of 
Dr. Kerr's prior sworn answer to the interrogatory by telling the jury in opening statement that Silk 
Touch used a detergent and enzymatic cleaner in the sterilization process used in Krystal's case, 
which directly contradicted Dr. Kerr's prior sworn testimony. This permitted the use of the prior 
inconsistent statements even if the rule could be interpreted as Silk Touch claim. 
Rule 33(b )(2) does not require a party to produce to an opposing party in advance of trial that 
very party's own interrogatory answer to refute the subsequent, inconsistent testimony and arguments 
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of that party. Silk Touch's claim to the contrary is without merit. 
G. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Allowing the .Jurors to Submit 
Questions as Permitted by I.R.C.P. 47(q) 
After re-direct examination of each witness, the district allowed the jurors to submit written 
questions pursuant to LR.C.P. 47(q), which provides: 
In the discretion of the court, jurors may be instructed that they are individually 
permitted to submit to the court a written question directed to any witness. If 
questions are submitted, the parties or counsel shall be given the opportunity to 
object to such questions outside the presence of the jury. If the questions are not 
objectionable, the court shall read the question to the witness. The parties or counsel 
may then be given the opportunity to ask follow-up questions as necessary. 
Silk Touch's challenge on appeal to this jury questioning appears to be three-fold: (1) 
claiming the district court violated the rule by not allowing the parties to object to the questions; (2) 
listing multiple admissibility challenges to individual questions that were not made during trial; and 
(3) challenging the practice in allowing jury questions. App. Brief, p. 74-84. However, the record 
establishes the parties had the opportunity to object and Silk Touch failed to preserve individual 
objections to the juror questions. Further, Idaho trial courts are afforded by rule the discretion to 
allow juror questions and the policy considerations underlying the decision of other states to disallow 
such questioning does not provide a basis for reversing the judgment in this case. 
In deciding to allow juror questions, the district court found the process had been beneficial 
in a recent trial. Tr. p. 7 5, In. 9-12. The district court noted that the jury in the prior trial appeared 
more engaged and focused when allowed to ask questions and that it seemed to heighten their ability 
to listen and digest information. Id at p. 75, In. 19-25. The district court indicated it would allow the 
jurors to write questions at the end of the re-direct testimony of each witness. Id at p. 77, In. 3-11. 
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The district court and counsel approached the bench to review the questions and the court indicated 
it would red-line questions it found inappropriate. Counsel would approach the bench, initial the 
question if acceptable and indicate "object" when there is an objection. Id. at p. 77, In. I I - p. 78, 
In. 15. The district court thus perceived the issue as discretionary, acted within the bounds of that 
discretion and exercised reason in making the decision to allow questions. 
Silk Touch nonetheless claim the district court abused its discretion because they contend 
they were only permitted to note "objection" on each juror question and there was never an 
opportunity for an open discussion regarding the nature of the questions. App. Brief p. 74. These 
assertions are belied by the record. In response to Silk Touch's inquiry, the district court indicated 
that it would rephrase questions where there were problems with form "but objections as to 
relevance, hearsay, meritorious objections can always be made" and the party can object if the 
witness veers off from the question. Id. at p. 79, In. 18 - p. 80, In. 2 ( emphasis added). After re-direct 
examination of each witness, the district court allowed the jurors to submit written questions. Id. at 
p. 509, In. 24 - p. 5 I 0, In. 7. The district court showed the questions to counsel and then discussed 
the questions at the bench. Id. at p. 510, In. 14-20. Notwithstanding the district court's invitation for 
parties to object to juror questions on various grounds, Silk Touch elected to note only "object" on 
every juror question without stating the legal basis for their objection. 20 
20Silk Touch list more than ten assignments of error regarding the juror questions to 
witnesses, which were not specifically objected to at trial. App. Brief p. 76-79. Even if this Court 
concluded that these alleged errors could be reviewed for the first time on appeal and that the district 
court erred in some respect, this Court disregards errors made on evidentiary rulings unless the 
rulings were a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and affected the party's substantial rights. 
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Silk Touch's suggestion that the they were provided insufficient opportunity to lay a record 
during the bench conference is similarly contradicted by the record. After the first witness, Dr. 
Sorensen, testified the jury was excused and the district court provided additional comments 
regarding the juror questions and invited Silk Touch to make an offer of proof. Silk Touch addressed 
several issues without specifically addressing the questions submitted by the jury. Tr. p. 518 - p. 5 24, 
In. 13. Additionally, the district court required the parties to appear every morning before trial to 
allow them to address any issues that could be taken up outside the jury's presence. Id. at p. 532, In. 
14-23. Beyond their global objection to allowing juror questions, Silk Touch did not state any 
specific objection to any juror question despite the district court's invitation that meritorious 
objections such as relevance or hearsay could "always" be made. 
Silk Touch complain the district court erred in various respects in allowing approximately 
ten questions. However, Silk Touch failed to make these objections in the trial court and they cannot 
be considered for the first time in this appeal. For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, 
either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must 
be apparent from the context. I.R.E. I 03(a)(l ); Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,473,299 P.3d 781, 
785 (2013); Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 921, 104 P.3d 958, 963 (2004). Objection to the 
admission of evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate and different basis to exclude the 
evidence. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003). This limitation on 
HF.LP., LLC v. City ofTwin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,686,339 P.3d 557,571 (2014); Perry v. Magic 
Valley Reg'l Med Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000). Given the considerable evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict detailed herein, any error in the questions submitted by jurors could 
not have effected Silk Touch's substantial rights. 
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appellate authority serves to induce the timely raising ofclaims and objections, which gives the trial 
court the opportunity to utilize its first hand knowledge to consider and resolve the issue, and 
prevents the litigant from sandbagging the court by remaining silent about an objection and belatedly 
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor. 5,'tate v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 
245 P.3d 961, 976(2010). 
Here, Silk Touch failed to raise any of their multiple, specific objections to the district court 
and, instead, simply raised a generic objection to every juror question. See Sealed Clerk's Record. 
According, they have waived any objection to those questions for purposes of this appeal. 21 
Finally, Silk Touch include a discussion of extra-jurisdictional authorities limiting or 
prohibiting the practice of juror questions. App. Brief p. 80-84. However, Rule 47(q) expressly 
permits the procedure followed by the district court and includes the safeguards discussed above. 
Silk Touch fail to establish an abuse of discretion in allowing juror questions and waived 
objections to specific questions. The judgment entered on the jury's verdict should be affirmed. 
H. Silk Touch Fail to Demonstrate any Error by the District Court that Effected Their 
Substantial Rights and the Doctrine of Cumulative Error Is Inapplicable 
Citing criminal precedent, Silk Touch claim that the judgment entered on the jury's verdict 
21 lronically, Silk Touch even now complain that the district court did not ask certain juror 
questions to which they generally objected. See App. Brief, p. 78 ( complaining district court elected 
not to read certain juror questions ofDrs. Coffman and Stiller). As for other objections made for the 
first time on appeal, Silk Touch largely now complain of appropriate questions regarding sterilization 
procedures, causation issues, or which were rephrased, and cannot credibly claim any such question 
affected their substantial rights. Silk Touch was entitled to state a specific objection to any such 
question and follow up on any issue raised by a juror question in further questioning of the witness. 
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should be reversed under the doctrine of cumulative error. App. Brief, p. 62-64. The cumulative error 
doctrine arises out of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and requires reversal 
of a conviction when there is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be 
harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's 
constitutional right to due process. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73, 165 P.3d 273, 286-87 
(2007); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). Silk Touch present neither 
argument nor authority establishing the above constitutional protections and the doctrine of 
cumulative error apply to a civil lawsuit. 
Instead, Silk Touch simply list a series of complaints regarding various evidentiary rulings, 
which Silk Touch neither objected to nor presented as issues on appeal. App. Brief p. 62-64. A 
general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to 
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 
263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). To the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the Idaho Appellate Rules, it is deemed to be waived. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790,229 
P.3d at 1152; Suitts, 141 Idaho at 708, 117 P.3d at 122. 
Even if Silk Touch could establish the applicability of the cumulative error doctrine in this 
civil case, they fail to establish a basis for reversal. A necessary predicate to the application of the 
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,483,272 P.3d 417,455 
(2012); Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P .3d at 982. Silk Touch have not established any error and the 
doctrine is thus, necessarily, inapplicable. 
Moreover, this Court disregards errors made on evidentiary rulings unless the rulings were 
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a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and affected the party's substantial rights. H.F.L.P., 
157 Idaho at 686,339 P.3d at 571; Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P.2d at 821. Similarly, an erroneous 
jury instruction does not constitute reversible error where the instruction taken as whole neither 
misleads nor prejudices a party. Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, 153 Idaho at 724,291 P.3d 
at 407; Robinson, 137 Idaho at 176, 45 P.3d at 832. As discussed supra, Charles presented 
compelling evidence that Silk Touch breached the community standard of care for sterilizing 
reusable surgical equipment and this breach led to the tragic death of twenty-seven year old Krystal. 
Therefore, even this Court finds that the district court erred in some respect and the 
cumulative error doctrine could be applied to this civil case, any error (individually or cumulatively) 
could not be said to have effected Silk Touch's substantial rights and would not require reversal of 
the judgment entered on the jury's verdict. 
I. This Court Should Award Fees and Costs Under J.C.§ 12-121 Because Silk Touch's 
Appeal is Frivolous, Unreasonable and Without Foundation 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 permits this Court to award "reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party." The Court will award fees if it determines "the action was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819,827,317 P.3d 716, 724 
(2013); Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619, 624 (1999). When an appellant fails 
to present a cogent argument as to why he should prevail, an award to his opponent is appropriate. 
Turner, 155 Idaho at 827, 317 P.3d at 724; Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225,228, 899 P.2d 438, 
441 ( 1995). Likewise, an award of attorney fees under this statute is appropriate if the appeal simply 
invites this Court "to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Turner, 15 5 Idaho at 827, 
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317 P.3d at 724; Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d. l 087, l 097 (2006 ). 
In this appeal, Silk Touch ask this Court to re-weigh the evidence, repeatedly misrepresent 
the record, misrepresent the import oflegal precedent, fail to cogently argue their assertions of error, 
and present multiple issues not preserved for appellate review with no argument or authority 
supporting review of such errors. Silk Touch's conduct in this regard also should be viewed in the 
context of their conduct in the district court, which includes, but certainly is not limited to, causing 
a mistrial, and the delays associated with their repeated and baseless requests that the district court 
include various documents in the appellate record. The combined effect of Silk Touch' s conduct has 
forced Charles to expend significant resources including now responding to the multitude of issues 
raised by Silk Touch in defense of this appeal - which further delays this case's ultimate resolution. 
Silk Touch' s conduct in this appeal, particularly when viewed in light of their conduct below 
and as found by the district court: "discredits the entire system of justice." Accordingly, this Court 
should conclude that the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation and award Charles his attorney's fees in this appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Charles respectfully asks that this Court affirm the judgments entered in this case and award 
attorney's fees and costs in defending this appeal. 
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Respectfully submitted this 29th day of September, 20 I 5. 
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